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About 270 million Americans and foreign guests visit the 368 units of the
National Park System every year.2 Catering to the visitor's needs for food,
lodging, transportation, recreation, and other services is big business.3 The
National Park Service (NPS), the agency within the Department of the Interior
that manages the national parks, contracts with private entities called conces-
sionaires4 to provide those services. In 1989, the NPS possessed about 1,000
long-term contracts and many more short-term licenses.' National Park con-
cessionaires grossed about $1.4 billion and paid fees to the government of $35
million, a 2.4% return, in that year.6 The National Tour Association estimates
that the presence of national parks contributes over $10 billion and 230,000
jobs to nearby communities.7 Tourism in the United States generally generates
about $417 billion in gross receipts.'
Several aspects of Park Service concession policies have been highly con-
troversial in recent years. Most complaints revolve around asserted overdevel-
opment of visitor facilities,9 monopolistic concessionaire arrangements and
practices,' ° artificial stimulation of visitor demand," meager financial return
1. Parts of this article were adapted from GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L.
GUCKSMAN, PuBLIc NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ch. 17 (1990, supplemented) [hereinafter PNRL].
* Tyler Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1963, Central Michigan University;
J.D. 1966, University of Michigan.
** Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas. A.B. 1973, Union College; M.A. 1974,
Harvard; J.D. 1977, Cornell Law School.
2. James T. Yenckel, Fearless Traveller: The Park System Squeeze, Visitors Will Feel the
Pinch of Budget Cutbacks, WASH. POST, May 19, 1996, at E01. The six federal agencies that
grant concession contracts recorded 1.6 billion visits to federal lands in 1991. Park Issues: Before
the Subcomm. of National Parks, Forests, and Public lands of the House Comm. on Natural Re-
sources, Hearings on H.R. 1527 & 2028, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of David Unger, Forest
Service).
3. See, e.g., Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environ-
mental Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369 (1994).
4. The federal law refers to concession contractors as "concessioners," 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g
(1994), but the dictionary and these writers prefer the original term, "concessionaires." See, e.g.,
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 376 (1977).
5. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: IMPROvEMENTS NEEDED IN MAN-
AGING CONCESSIONS 4 (June 1991) [hereinafter GAO, IMPROVEMENTS].
6. Id. at 2. In 1993, more than 9,000 concessionaires on federal lands grossed in excess of
$2 billion. H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1, at 566 (1995).
7. Hearing on Recreation Fees at Public Parks Before the Subcomm. on National Parks,
Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Natural Resources., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of
James D. Santini, NTA Rep.).
8. Id.
9. See infra part HA.
10. See infra part IIB.2.b.ii.
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to the government, 2 inadequate facility maintenance, administrative secrecy
in the contracting processes, 3 and general lack of competition. 4 A bill to
reform NPS concessions law was passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of
Congress in 1995 but died as the session expired. 5 Rival bills on the same
subject were pending in 1996.16
This article explicates current law governing NPS concessions and assess-
es ideas and proposals for reform. Part I outlines the factual background con-
cerning the National Park System, the NPS, and current concession operations,
and compares the NPS situation with that of the other three major federal land
management agencies. The second part investigates NPS concession law and
policy in some detail. The National Parks System Concessions Policy Act of
1965"7 and related rules create a unique contractual milieu for the agency, the
contractors, and the public. Part I catalogues the complaints that various
parties have leveled against the current system. It also recounts and evaluates a
wide spectrum of proposals for change.
I. THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM AND ITS CONCESSIONAIRES
A. The National Park System
America's national parks often have been characterized as the best idea
the United States Congress ever had. 8 Since the creation of Yellowstone and
Yosemite National Parks a century and a quarter ago, Congress has expanded
the National Park System to 368 units encompassing over 83 million acres; a
majority of the park acreage is in Alaska. The process is ongoing: 5.5 million
acres in the California Desert Conservation area were designated as Mohave
National Park in 1994,"9 and sentiment for park establishment in other areas
is a political constant.2' The rest of the world took notice and flattered the
United States by emulation: virtually every country on the globe now has its
own national parks.
11. See infra part IIIC.1.
12. See infra part IIB.2.d.
13. See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
14. See infra part llD.1.
15. 141 CONG. REc. S1945 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
16. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Hansen); H.R. 773, 104th Cong.
(1995) (introduced by Rep. Meyers); S. 309, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Bennett); see
also Reform in Concessions Mgmt. in Fed. Agencies: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
National Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996); and
Concession Reform is Needed: Testimony of Victor S. Rezendes Before the Subcomm. on National
Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. (1996) (detailing sev-
eral aspects of the debate over the issue of concessions reform).
17. National Park System Concession Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1994).
18. See, e.g., David J. Simon, Preface to OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL
PARKS xii (David J. Simon ed., Island Press, 1988) (defending the national park concept); Paul C.
Pitchard, The Best Idea America Ever Had, Nat'l Geographic, Aug. 1991, at 36 (supporting the
establishment of national parks).
19. California Desert Protection Act of 1994, 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa - 410aaa-83 (1994); see
140 CONG. REC. S14961-03 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994).
20. E.g., H.R. 1449, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve);
H.R. 2763, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing Boston Harbor Islands National Recreation Area).
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Establishment of national parks in the United States might not have been
possible without the tourist industry. The Northern Pacific Railroad was an
enthusiastic booster of the original Yellowstone bill because its owner correct-
ly foresaw that a large number of people would need the railroad to visit this
fabled, mysterious place." The informal alliance between environmentalists
and preservationists and tourist service providers has endured, with occasional
strains, ever since.
By 1900, Congress had created five more national parks in addition to
Yellowstone. The park unit creation process exploded in this century, and the
expansion promises to continue into the 21st century. In 1906, Congress dele-
gated to the President the power to designate areas as national monuments.2
After 1916, when Congress formalized the National Park System,23 the monu-
ments were included within it. National park creation became politically popu-
lar, in part because local citizens realized that park designation usually resulted
in increased economical activity near, as well as in, the park area.24 In the
early 1980s, Interior Secretary James Watt decried that popularity, stating that
he would end "park barrel politics" and new "park-a-month" policies.'
Congress gradually added new zoning categories for park system units in
addition to parks and monuments. The more important of the twenty current
categories other than parks proper are national preserves, national recreation
areas, wild and scenic river segments, national seashores, and national battle-
field monuments. National preserves (e.g., Big Cypress26 ) are similar to na-
tional parks, but Congress differentiated the categories to allow more human
uses, notably hunting, on the preserves than in the parks.' National recre-
ation areas (NRAs) primarily are of two kinds: lands surrounding and includ-
ing reservoirs, for example, Lake Mead' set aside for recreational pursuits;
and excess federal holdings near urban areas (e.g., Golden Gate NRA9). Na-
tional rivers (e.g., Buffalo NR") and wild and scenic river segments3" are
ribbon-like parks along selected river corridors. 2 Battlefield monuments (e.g.,
Gettysburg33) are premised more on historical than ecological or recreational
21. See ALFRED RUNTE, JR., TRAINS OF DiscovERY, WESTERN RAILROADs AND THE NA-
TIONAL PARKS 19 (rev. ed. 1990).
22. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1994).
23. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
24. See John L. Giesser, The National Park Service and External Development: Addressing
Park Boundary Area Threats Through Public Nuisance, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 761, 770-71
(1993).
25. George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Recreational Land Policy:
The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 125,
166 (1984); see also George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains":
The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law
and Policy, 17 B.C. ENvTL. AFP. L. REV. 473 (1990).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 698f - 698m-4 (1994).
27. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 7.86(e) (1996) (hunting in Big Cypress National Preserve).
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460n - 460n-9 (1994).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460bb - 460bb5.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m-8 - 460m14.
31. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1994).
32. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 15.
33. 16 U.S.C. §§ 430g - 430g-10 (1994).
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significance. Other categories of lands that Congress has added to the National
Park System include lake shores, trails, historical sites, a cultural area, a train
museum, and scenic highways.34 Offshore parks, called national marine sanc-
tuaries, are not included within the park system.35
In spite of its continuing growth, the National Park System is still the
smallest federal land management system by acreage. National wildlife refuges
(90 plus million acres), national forests (about 190 million acres), and Bureau
of Land Management public lands (about 270 million acres) are all larger but
less well known. Even the relative newcomer, the Wilderness Preservation
System, created in 1964,36 has more acreage (about 100 million acres),37 but
roughly forty million of its acres are within the park system.
Resource management within the national park system has come under
increasing attack in recent years. Some writers decry the wildlife management
practices of the NPS.3" Other critics are concerned about external threats to
park amenities stemming from such causes as adjacent timber harvests,39
power plant emissions,' water diversions,4' ranching,42 and commercial
and residential development.43 Controversy over facilities and concessions
policy also has erupted in several instances in recent years, the most notable
being the replacement of the Yosemite concessionaire."
B. The National Park Service (NPS)
Congress chartered the NPS in 1916.' The NPS is a line agency within
the Department of the Interior. Its structure, a hierarchy, runs from the lowliest
temporary worker to the Interior Secretary. In 1994, the NPS had a budget of
about $972 million, which rose to about $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1996.'
The agency takes in about 33 cents per visit, but each visit costs the NPS
about $4.12.'
34. See generally WILLIAM EVERHARDT, THE FAMILY TREE OF THE NATIONAL PARK SYS-
TEM (1972).
35. Pursuant to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§
1431-1447 (1994), marine sanctuaries are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.
36. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
37. See George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Power, Procedure, and Policy in
Public Lands and Resources Law, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 3, 82 (1995); William H.
Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology,
27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1009, 1010 (1994).
38. See ALsToN CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOwSTONE (1986).
39. See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modi-
fied, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
40. See Central Ariz. Water Conserv. Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1993).
41. See United States v. South Fla. Water Management Dist., 28 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
42. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D.D.C. 1992).
43. See United States v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979)
[hereinafter Arlington County]. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, § 14.03; JOHN L. FREEMUTH,
ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE (1991); Giesser, supra note 24; Robert B. Keiter, On Protecting the Na-
tional Parks from the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 355 (1987).
44. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
45. National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994).
46. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 23, 30.
47. Id. at 30.
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The NPS is headquartered in the nation's capital. The NPS headquarters
staff develop NPS policies, programs, and regulations, and coordinate NPS
activities with Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, and other
government entities. The Headquarters Office consists of the Office of the
Director and five Associate Directors. The Office of the Director includes the
Director and Deputy Director, the Assistant Director for External Affairs, and
the Chief of the Office of International Affairs.' The Associate Directors
include Park Operations and Education,49 Natural Resource Stewardship and
Science,5° Cultural Resource Stewardship and Partnerships,5 Professional
Services,52 and Administration. 3
The NPS field units (or parks) are organized into a maximum of 16 "eco-
logical-cultural-geographical clusters of 10-35 units each." 4 Seven Field Di-
rector Offices supervise budgetary matters, media relations, and policy direc-
tion for the field units within their boundaries." Sixteen System Support Of-
fices, each headed by a Superintendent, provide professional, technical, and
administrative services, serve as liaisons with other agencies and interests, and
participate in ecosystem management for a specific cluster of field units. 6
The larger parks have staff members for law enforcement, 7 interpretation,
and maintenance, as well as biologists, ecologists, and even landscape archi-
tects.
58
The National Park System Act endows the NPS with the mission to pre-
48. National Park Service Reorganization, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,601 (1995).
49. This Associate Director supervises the Statistical Unit and the Field Operations Technical
Support Center in Denver, Colorado; the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho; and the
Interpretive Design Center in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia. Id. at 40,601-02.
50. This Associate Director is in charge of environmental quality in park system units and
supervises the Chief Scientist for the NPS and the Natural Resources Program Center in Denver
and Fort Collins, Colorado. Id. at 40,602.
51. This Associate Director supervises grants administration, rivers, trails, and conservation
assistance, and state program review. He or she also oversees the Cultural Resources Program
Support Center, the Partnership Programs Service Center, and the National Center for Preservation
Technology and Training. Id.
52. This official is responsible for land resources and strategic planning and supervises Cen-
ters for Planning, Design and Construction (in Denver) and Information and Telecommunications
(in Denver and Washington, D.C.). Id.
53. This Associate Director is the Chief Financial Officer for the NPS and supervises two
Administrative Service Centers in Denver and the District of Columbia, as well as several Nation-
al Program Centers for Accounting Operations and Employee Development. Id.
54. Id. "The cluster serves as a framework for cooperation and decision-making rather than a
staffed organizational entity." Id; see also Change in Organizational Title from Regional Director
to Field Director, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,504 (1996).
55. The Seven Field Director Offices are for the Northwest (in Philadelphia), Southeast (in
Atlanta), Midwest (in Omaha), Intermountain (in Denver), Pacific West (in San Francisco), Alaska
(in Anchorage), and National Capital (in Washington, D.C.). National Park Service Reorganiza-
tion, 60 Fed. Reg. at 40,602.
56. Id. Regulations governing management of each NPS unit are published at 36 C.F.R §§
7.1-7.100 (1996).
57. In 1994, the FBI began training park rangers to investigate crimes in or near the parks.
Until recently, most criminal matters involving the parks were theft-related, but the focus of law
enforcement in the parks has shifted to activities that result in resource degradation, including
waste dumping, acid mine drainage, wetlands destruction, and oil spills. See 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2075 (1994).
58. See Audubon Wildlife Report - 1986 at 468.
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serve the scenery, wildlife, and other attributes of "parks, monuments, and
reservations" for the benefit of present and future generations.59 That mission
involves an inherent tension between recreation and preservation, a tension
highlighted in the matter of concession facility development and promotion.'
The 1965 Concessions Policy Act authorizes facility development but specifi-
cally subordinates development to the basic preservational purposes of national
park establishment.6'
The mission of the NPS has been diluted and fragmented by additional
tasks and duties assigned to it by Congress over the years. The NPS acts as
the overseer for federal areas in Washington, D.C.,' the landlord for spas
and resorts,63 the custodian of important (and some historically marginal)
houses and sites,' the patrolman for two scenic highways,' the curator of a
railroad museum,' and the administrator of a cultural area.6' Twenty years
ago, former Professor Futrell suggested that the agency and the nation would
be better served if the NPS reverted to its earlier, purer mission.' A bill in-
troduced in 1995 would have required a study to determine whether and to
what extent the Park Service should divest itself of its less significant hold-
ings.'
Congress gave the NPS ample regulatory authority and discretion, al-
though the agency seldom possesses sufficient funds to carry out its mandate
fully.7" The agency is severely restricted in the fees it can charge for park
admission,7 and its appropriations have fallen drastically compared to visitor
59. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. National Park Systems Concessions Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
62. 40 U.S.C. § 804 (1988).
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 361-374 (1994).
64. See Weir Farm National Historic Site Establishment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-485,
104 Stat. 1171 (1990).
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460a-1 to 460a-Il (1994).
66. 16 U.S.C. §§ 410vv to 410vv-8 (1994) (Marsh-Billings National Historic Park).
67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 284-284j (1994) (Wolf Trap Farm Park).
68. J. William Futrell, Parks to the People: New Directions for the National Park System, 25
EMORY LJ. 255, 269-71, 316 (1976).
69. H.R. 260, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The proposed National Park System Reform
Act is described at 141 CONG. REc. H9083-01 (1995). Congress evidently dropped the divestiture
notion in the face of concerted public opposition.
70. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL PARKS - DIFFICULT CHOICES NEED TO
BE MADE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PARKS (1995) [hereinafter GAO, DuiFFCULT CHOICES]. The
GAO reported in 1995 that
[t]here is cause for concern about the health of national parks for both visitor services
and resource management. The overall level of visitor services was deteriorating at most
of the park units that GAO reviewed. Services were being cut back, and the condition of
many trails, campgrounds, and other facilities was declining.
Id. Between 1988 and 1995, the dollar amount of the NPS maintenance backlog increased from
$1.9 billion to over $4 billion. The GAO attributed this increase to a combination of additional
operating requirements placed on parks by laws and administrative requirements and increased
visitation, which drives up the parks' operating costs. The GAO concluded that the principal op-
tions for dealing with the problem are increasing the amount of financial resources going to the
parks, limiting or reducing the number of units in the park system, and reducing the level of visi-
tor services. Id.
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-6a, 4601-6c (1994). Cf 16 U.S.C. § 460k-3 (1994) (Interior Secretary
may establish reasonable charges and fees for public use of national wildlife refuges).
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levels.72
Unlike the other federal land management agencies, the NPS is not re-
quired to defer to state law in wildlife management or similar matters."3 The
courts are virtually unanimous in their deference to NPS exercises of its dis-
cretionary authority in this area. Courts have deferred to the NPS in its efforts
to remove wild horses,74 enforce quotas on river rafting,75 ban hunting,76
trapping, 7 and fishing,7' allow promotional advertising, 79 regulate0 and
terminate" concessionaires, allow snowmobile use, 2 and restrict biking.'3
The agency has complete authority over access.8' The only instances located
in which courts enjoined NPS proposals involved plans for a hotel" and for
increased stock animals in park wilderness areas."
The NPS enjoys a unique niche in the pantheon of federal land manage-
ment agencies. Its mission is far more circumscribed than those of the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the
Forest Service (FS). These all have some responsibilities for production of
commodities from the natural resources under their jurisdictions;' 7 the NPS
does not. Consequently, the NPS is relatively immune from the political pres-
sures imposed by loggers and miners, although it has experienced difficulties
caused by ranchers," water diverters," hunters,' developers, '  and
states.' Further, the NPS is far more visible (and politically protected) than
the other agencies because it is the custodian of the nation's most beloved
scenic treasures.
72. See 140 CONG. REc. S4102, S4106, S4108 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Wallop).
73. See PNRL, supra note 1, § 18.02[4][b][iJ.
74. Wilkins v. Lujan, 995 F.2d 850, 852-53 (8th Cir. 1993).
75. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979).
76. United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 819, 821-23 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 909-14 (D.D.C. 1986).
78. Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1985).
79. Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
80. See Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Washington Metro Area Transit Comm'n, 393
U.S. 186, 188-89, 194 (1968).
81. See YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 417-18 (1993).
82. Voyageurs Region Nat'l. Park Ass'n v. Lujan, 966 F.2d 424, 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1992).
But cf. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334, 1335-36, 1344 (D. Minn. 1996) (remanding closure
of lakeshore area to snowmobiling for lack of adequate explanation from the lower court).
83. Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).
84. See Christianson v. Hauptman, 991 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1993); Biderman v. Morton, 507
F.2d 396, 398 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289, 1291, 1293 (D. Ariz. 1989).
86. High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Kennedy, No. C-94-3570 CW, 1995 WL 382369 (N.D. Cal.
June 14, 1995), vacated pursuant to settlement, 1996 WL 421435 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1996).
87. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, chs. 19-20, 22-25.
88. For example, ranchers bitterly opposed the reintroduction of wolves into the Yellowstone
National Park ecosystem. See id. § 15C.04[3].
89. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-38, 143 (1976).
90. See NRA v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 910-11 (D.D.C. 1986).
91. See Arlington County, 487 F. Supp. at 141-44.
92. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1982).
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C. National Park Concessions
It is difficult to describe all of the concession contracts and licenses en-
tered into by the NPS. The NPS uses the "contract" mechanism for larger,
long-term agreements that often contemplate construction or maintenance of
physical facilities.93 Commercial use licenses, on the other hand, are used to
authorize smaller scale services, usually without construction of fixtures or
improvements."' The presence of a national park obviously benefits tourist
businesses in nearby communities,95 but this subsection discusses only the
services delivered or facilities operated within the boundaries of park system
units.
1. Facilities
Most facilities within national parks were constructed by the NPS, but
some concessionaires are required by their contracts to construct, repair, main-
tain, or improve physical facilities. Record title to such improvements remains
in the United States, although the concessionaires, as beneficial owners, have
certain statutory rights to compensation if the agreement is terminated.9 Park
roads, perhaps the most important facilities from the perspective of the aver-
age visitor, almost always are built and maintained by the agency.' Likewise,
visitor centers and campgrounds tend to be constructed and operated by the
NPS.98 Still, the galaxy of products and services demanded or desired by visi-
tors is vast, and concessionaires usually provide them. These include the basic
human needs of food and shelter: private entrepreneurs commonly provide
restaurants, hotels, motels, and permanent tent installations. In some park sys-
tem units, concessionaires also operate ski areas, marinas, boat and snowmo-
bile rentals, gift and souvenir shops, photo labs, and gas stations."
2. Services
Many facilities in parks exist to provide services. Nevertheless, certain
service concessions are less dependent upon physical facilities. For example,
some canoe renters are located outside parks and merely launch or pick up
canoes within parks."° Similarly, float trips often travel through parks but
depend on base facilities outside- parks to store equipment and organize trips
93. See infra Part I.C.I.
94. See infra Part I.C.2.
95. See Rhonda Bodfield, New Funds Will Keep Canyon Open, TUCSON CITIZEN, Jan. 3,
1996, at 1B (stating that Grand Canyon tourists add $250 million to Arizona economy).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 20e (1994); see infra Part II.B.2.c.
97. See Maria E. Mansfield, A Primer of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REv. 801, 843
(1993).
98. Id.
99. See YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366 (1993).
100. See Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972).
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(as do air tours).' Guides and outfitters,"r2 firewood merchants, °3 shuttle
bus companies," houseboat" and boat slip rentals," camper and fish-
ing goods suppliers," marine fuel distributors,'as hot shower providers,"
trail ride and horse boarding services,"0 pack animal providers,"' and sani-
tary napkin providers"' all supply goods or services for use inside the parks.
D. Concessions in Other Federal Land Management Systems
Six federal land management agencies grant concession contracts to pri-
vate entities; 80% of such contracts are let by the NPS, the FS, and the
BLM." 3 The General Accounting Office (GAO) identified about 9,000 such
agreements in 1991, but its information concededly was incomplete."' The
100 largest concessions generated about sixty-five percent of total reve-
nues." 5 In fiscal year 1994, the GAO identified 10,427 concession agree-
ments entered into by the six land management agencies, representing ninety-
two percent of all such agreements with the federal government."6 NPS and
FS concession operations accounted for about ninety percent of these six
agencies' reported concessionaires' gross revenues and fees paid to the gov-
ernment.' "'
Although eleven different federal statutes impact public land conces-
sions,"' no other agency is subject to a statute comparable to the NPS's
Concessions Policy Act. This section briefly summarizes the concessions law
and policy of the three other major land management agencies-the FS, the
BLM, and the FWS. Special purpose policies of the Bureau of Reclama-
tion" 9 and of the Army Corps of Engineers' are not discussed except
101. See Grand Canyon Dorries, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1974); Concession
Permit, 61 Fed. Reg. 1401 (1996).
102. See United States v. Patzer, 15 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1993).
103. See Lewis v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1993).
104. See Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552 (CI. Ct. 1978).
105. See Roosevelt Recreation Enterprises, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,685 (1991).
106. See Lake Mohave Boat Owners Ass'n v. National Park Serv., 78 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir.
1995); Lake Mead Nat'l Recreation Area Operation of a Marine at Willow Beach, 61 Fed. Reg.
37,923 (1996).
107. See Concession Permit, 61 Fed Reg. 1401 (1996); Concession Contract Negotiations, 54
Fed. Reg. 18,941 (1989).
108. Concession Contract Negotiations, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,941 (1989).
109. See Proposal to Award Concession Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,637 (1996).
110. See 61 Fed. Reg. 37,077 (1996); Notice of Intention to Extend Existing Concession
Contracts, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,204 (1996).
111. See Notice of Intent to Issue a Prospectus for the Operation of Pack Station Servs. and
Facilities within Sequoia Nat'l Park, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,950 (1996).
112. See Concession Permit Proposal, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,411 (1995).
113. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 5.
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING: GOVERNMENTWIDE
RATES OF RETURN (1996) [hereinafter GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING].
117. Id.
118. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 5, at 3.
119. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S11,006, S1 1,030 (daily ed. July 31, 1992) (proposing legisla-
tion concerning concession operation at Lake Berryessa).
120. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H10,995, HI 1,073 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (proposing legis-
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where they may intersect with or influence the other agencies.
1. Forest Service
Ski areas are the most important types of concessions in the national for-
ests.'2t Before 1986, the FS typically granted ski area operators a term per-
mit for the use of eighty acres for the main facilities and revocable special use
permits for the area necessary for ski runs, lifts, and so forth.'" The Nation-
al Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 198623 gives the Agriculture Secretary au-
thority to issue forty-year leases for the amount of acreage he "determines
sufficient and appropriate.' 24 Ski area developers must pay fair market value
for the permit privilege."z
For other types of concessions, the FS has general authority to regulate
occupancy and use of the national forests 126 and specific authority to permit
visitor facility development.2 7 Except for casual recreational use, uses of the
national forests for profit require permits.
128
2. BLM
The BLM lacks a specific concessions statute. BLM's power to authorize
the provision of visitor services stems from its general authority under the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).' 9 Therefore, BLM
concession law is found in the agency's rather cursory regulations"3 and in
decisions of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 3' Fair market value
guides the permit fee for permits conveying a possessory interest in land,'
but special recreation permits are available at administrative cost.'33 The au-
thorized BLM officer possesses large discretion in the issuance of permits and
land use authorizations.
34
lation concerning commercial concessions at Corps of Engineers Projects); Park Issues Before the
Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks, Forests, and Lands of the House Comm. on Resources 1995 WL
446825 (F.D.C.H.) (July 25, 1995) (statement of Barry J. Frankell, Army Corps of Engineers).
121. In 1995, 143 ski areas occupied about 183,000 acres of national forestland. S. REP. No.
104-183, at 3 (1995). This amounts to about 0.1 % of all FS lands. H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1,
at 566 (1995).
122. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 756, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
123. National Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 497b (1994).
124. Id. § 497b(b)(3).
125. Id. § 497b(b)(8). See generally PNRL, supra note 1, § 17.04[31[b].
126. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
127. Id. § 497.
128. See United States v. Hells Canyon Guide Serv. Inc., 660 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. 36
C.F.R. § 251.53 (1996) (listing Forest Service authorities for issuance of special use permits).
129. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732, 1733, 1740 (1994).
130. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2820, 2920, 8372 (1995).
131. See PNRL, supra note 1, § 17.04[4].
132. 43 C.F.R. § 2920.0-6 (1995).
133. Id. § 8372.4.
134. Id. §§ 2920.2-2, 2920.5-4, 8372.5(b).
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3. FWS
The FWS regulations merely recite that concessions contracts may be
granted "where there is a demonstrated justified need for services or facili-
ties," 3 that "a person granted economic use privileges" needs to observe the
agreement conditions," 6 and that concessionaires cannot discriminate on ra-
cial or similar grounds.'7
II. THE LAW OF CONCESSIONS IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM
The law governing the granting of concessions contracts for facilities and
services in the national parks is much more extensive than the parallel body of
law applicable to the other federal land management agencies. The Conces-
sions Policy Act grants broad authority to the NPS to contract with conces-
sionaires located both within and outside the parks. Although the exercise of
this authority creates the potential for conflict with the NPS's obligation to
subordinate the provision of resources within its jurisdiction for recreational
use to preservational needs, the courts have been loathe to interfere with the
balance struck by the agency.
Concessions contracts with the NPS form a unique niche in the laws gov-
erning contractual relations. They differ from other contracts with the federal
government in that the application of normal federal procurement rules is
unclear. They depart from contracts between purely private entities because
concessionaires may have rights typically not available to other contractors,
such as protections against loss of investment and preferential renewal rights.
Part R of this article describes the unique attributes of NPS concessions con-
tracts, while Part HI analyzes the policy implications of those attributes.
A. Propriety of Facility Development
Concessionaire charters for recreational facilities and services raise two
fundamental issues: first, when and where such facilities are permissible and
appropriate; and, what the relative rights and responsibilities are of the con-
cessionaire, the government, and the user public. The propriety of furnishing
recreational facilities is partly a function of the law governing the particular
land management system. Usually, it is also a function of land management
agency discretion. The FS and the BLM must balance the recreational benefits
against the environmental or resource costs of such facilities in the context of
multiple use, sustained yield management of all surface resources. The NPS
(and, to a lesser extent, the FWS) must insure that recreational development
does not unduly detract from its preservational mission. The underlying policy
considerations and conundrums are delineated in Professor Sax's excellent
1980 book, Mountains Without Handrails.3 Groups challenging proposed
135. 50 C.F.R. § 25.61 (1995).
136. Id. § 26.25.
137. Id. § 3.3(a).
138. JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WrrHour HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL
PARKS (1980).
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recreational facilities on federal lands because of asserted environmental prob-
lems have had little success.
The National Park System Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to man-
age the parks and other units in the system for present enjoyment as well as
preservation.' It also explicitly empowers the Secretary to contract for rec-
reational services.Y The NPS Concessions Policy Act (CPA) 4' subordi-
nates facility development to the basic preservation mission:
Congress hereby finds that the preservation of park values requires
that such public accommodations, facilities, and services as have to
be provided ... should be provided only under carefully controlled
safeguards against unregulated and indiscriminate use .... It is the
policy of the Congress that such development shall be limited to
those that are necessary and appropriate for public use and enjoy-
ment ... and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree
with the preservation and conservation of the areas. 4 2
The judiciary has not defined the outer boundaries of the resulting discretion
to encourage recreational use at the arguable expense of preservation. 43 Only
one court has enjoined an NPS-approved facility or contract on grounds that
approval would have exceeded the statutory limits or contravened the statutory
purposes.'"
Many environmentalists assert that some national parks and other federal
areas have become festooned with restaurants, shops, campgrounds, ski areas,
roads, lodges, and like facilities to an entirely inappropriate degree. 45 They
argue that the preservation purpose of park establishment should outweigh
visitor accommodation desires for development beyond bare necessities. What-
ever the intrinsic merits of that argument, it must be made in a political or
administrative forum to succeed because the courts appear emphatically disin-
clined to overturn NPS discretion in licensing recreational facilities." Some
of the allegedly more abusive situations, however, apparently have not been
the subjects of litigation.47
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
140. Id. §§ 3, 17b.
141. National Park System Concessions Policy Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1994).
142. Id. § 20.
143. Cf Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary of the Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989)
(upholding National Park Service plan that authorized off-road vehicle use on Cape Cod National
Seashore); Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah 1983) (upholding regulation allowing
leasing of "locatable" minerals within national recreation area); Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell,
420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (challenging construction of sanitation and housing facilities in
national park).
144. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Ariz. 1989). Cf. High Sierra Hikers Ass'n,
1995 WL 382369 (enjoining increase in use of stock animals in wilderness area).
145. See Michael Mantell, Preservation and Use: Concessions in the Nat'l Parks, 8 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1 (1979); THE CONSERVATION FOuND., NAT'L PARKS FOR A NEW GENERATION (1985).
146. The political process is not a negligible factor in such disputes. Public pressure led to a
new Yosemite National Park concessionaire contract that will raise the government's revenue
share about 2500 %. U.S. Picks Concessionaire for Yosemite Park, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at
A22.
147. The influence of the concessionaire at Yosemite, and the intensive road and facility de-
velopment at Yellowstone, are examples of arguable abuses of discretion. See ALFRED RUNE,
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Judicial opinions in several cases endorse NPS actions relating to recre-
ational facilities and concessionaires. Park Service discretion to limit recre-
ational activities and facilities by commercial enterprises has been upheld in
every litigated instance located."4 In the Grand Canyon Access case,"'9 the
reviewing court upheld an NPS allocation of most rafting rights to commercial
outfitters, even though the general quota meant reduced rafting opportunities
for individuals. Similarly, a court refused injunctive relief to a cruise ship
operator to which the NPS denied permits to enter Glacier Bay because of a
previous collision."5 Conversely, environmentalists' efforts to force closure
of a campground in Yellowstone to assist grizzly bear recovery were unavail-
ing,15' and a California court found no need for the NPS to restrict its
concessionaire's advertising campaigns in the face of allegations linking ad-
vertising to overuse of Yosemite National Park.'52
Research has disclosed only a single instance in which NPS discretion in
allowing more intensive recreation through facility development has been
judicially disturbed.5 3 That instance should give the NPS pause, however.
The agency entered into a contract for construction of a hotel without NEPA
compliance and in seeming conflict with the policies of the master plan for the
area. Its later environmental evaluation evidently was limited to where the
hotel should be located, not whether it should be built.'54 The court prelimi-
narily enjoined construction by the concessionaire because it thought that dual
noncompliance was probably arbitrary and capricious.' This decision is
only a blip on the screen of deference, but it illustrates that NPS discretion has
some bounds."5
Despite the absence of a significant body of case law questioning the
propriety of the NPS's exercise of its authority to grant concessions, the devel-
NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMECAN EXPERIENCE 169 (2d ed. 1987) (addressing Yosemite); CHASE,
supra note 38 (addressing Yellowstone).
148. E.g., Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 771 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Carter, 339 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Ariz. 1972). See also Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876
F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1989).
149. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979); see also
United States v. Garren, 893 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding procedures for allocating use of
Rouge River between commercial and non-commercial uses).
150. Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1994).
151. National Wildlife Fed'n v. National Park Serv., 699 F. Supp. 384 (D. Wyo. 1987). The
court stressed that the Secretary's discretion in balancing "promotion" and "preservation" was
"very broad." Id. at 391; see also Grand Canyon Dottles, Inc. v. Walker, 500 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1974) (disallowing an injunctive claim under implied contract to keep dam discharges steady).
152. Friends of Yosemite, 420 F. Supp. at 393.
153. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 716 F. Supp. 1289 (D. Ariz. 1989).
154. Sierra Club, 716 F. Supp. at 1291-92.
155. Id. at 1293.
156. In High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, the district court enjoined the Park Service from increasing
the number of stock animals allowed in wilderness areas of the Sequoia and Kings Canyon Na-
tional Parks because the agency failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994). The court acknowledged NPS fimdings that the increase would
result in little or no change in use patterns and that the impact of any change on the environment
would be sufficiently mitigated to be "badly flawed." High Sierra Hikers Ass'n, 1995 WL 382369,
at *9. In addition, the agency failed to address adequately the affect of the increase on a threat-
ened species of bighorn sheep. Id. at *13-*14. The decision holds limited precedent value, howev-
er, since it is unpublished and was later vacated.
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opment of the facilities and the provision of services covered by these con-
tracts may conflict with the NPS's raison d'dtre, the preservation of America's
unique national heritage. Incantations of judicial deference to agency balancing
of objectives can easily substitute for meaningful analysis of the limits of
agency discretion. The subordination of the NPS's recreational mandate to its
preservational mission in the CPA, however, takes the form of a policy state-
ment '7 rather than being an enforceable, non-discretionary decree. The
courts are loathe to translate such precatory admonitions into "real law." Ab-
sent legislative reform, litigants probably will continue to have a better chance
of successfully challenging the particular provisions of an NPS concessions
contract as contrary to agency regulations and guidance than they have of
blocking the issuance of the contract on the ground that it exceeds the
agency's statutory authority.
B. The NPS Relationship with Concessionaires and Permittees
1. Park Service Authority
The CPA of 1965' a clarifies contractual rights and responsibilities of
private entrepreneurs in national park system units.'59 Recognizing that the
parks faced danger of irreparable damage from heavy visitation, Congress in
the CPA reaffirmed conservation as the primary park management goal."w
Facility developments must be consistent to the "highest practicable degree"
with preservation goals.
16 1
The CPA is not the exclusive authority for awarding park concessions.
The National Park System Act of 1916 instructs the Secretary to "promote" as
well as "regulate" park use and empowers the Secretary to make necessary
rules, 62 "grant privileges, leases, and permits,"1 63 and enter into contracts
for visitor accommodation.'" The NPS regularly granted monopolies and
preference renewal rights to concessionaires before enactment of the CPA."6
Legislation establishing individual park system units may provide additional
157. 16 U.S.C. § 20.
158. Id. §§ 20-20g.
159. Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Parks Concessions Policies, S.
REP. No. 89-765 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489-3501. See generally National Parks
and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994). NPS regulations reflect this priority:
[Ilt is the policy of the Secretary of the Interior, as mandated by law, to permit conces-
sions in park areas only under carefully controlled safeguards against unregulated and
indiscriminate use so that heavy visitation will not unduly impair park values and re-
sources. Concession activities in park areas shall be limited to those that are necessary
and appropriate for public use and enjoyment of park areas in which they are located
and that are consistent to the highest practicable degree with the preservation and con-
servation of the park areas.
36 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1996).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 20 (1994).
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1994).
163. Id. § 3.
164. Id. § 17b.
165. See United States v. Gray Line Water Tours, 311 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1962).
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authority and guidance on concessions for those units."s The National Visi-
tor Center Facility Act,67 for instance, governs tours within Washington,
D.C. and it preempts contrary local law.'
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the Secretary's broad pow-
ers to contract with concessionaires."69 That power extends not only to all
lands and waters within the park system, 7 ' it also covers businesses that
only enter the park to pick up canoes launched outside the park.'7' The Sec-
retary may prohibit solicitation of tourist business on federal property.'72
Whether or to what extent NPS concessionaire contracting is subject to
general government contract and procurement law are issues that apparently
have not been completely resolved. In a 1978 decision, the Court of Claims
stated that it was "not convinced that the NPS ... can avoid normal, legally
mandated, procurement procedures, simply by characterizing the procurement
of transportation services for the public as the granting of a 'concession' to a
specific contractor."'7 The concession in that case differed from the norm in
that the NPS had agreed to pay the concessionaire for providing shuttle bus
services. Because the general procurement contract requirements applied, the
contract was invalid for violation of those restrictions. Despite that invalidity,
the contractor could recover in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the
services performed. 74 The same court, in 1982, opined that a Bureau of the
Budget Circular on cost recovery applied to an NPS agreement to provide
electricity to a concessionaire.'75 In 1989, the interior Board of Contract Ap-
peals ruled that NPS concessions agreements were procurement contracts and
thus within the ambit of the federal Contract Disputes Act (CDA) .
76
Several developments cast doubt on whether the full panoply of federal
procurement law applies to NPS concession contracts. First, the NPS altered
its regulations to read that its concession contracts "are not Federal procure-
ment contracts ... within the meaning of statutory or regulatory requirements
applicable to Federal procurement actions."' 7  Administrative interpretations
are ordinarily entitled to some judicial deference. 7 1 Second, the Court of
Federal Claims thereafter ruled in YRT that the NPS was not subject to the
166. See 16 U.S.C. § 22 (1994) (Yellowstone National Park).
167. National Visitor Center Facility Act of 1968, 40 U.S.C. §§ 801-831 (1994).
168. United States v. District of Columbia, 571 F.2d 651, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
169. Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp., 393 U.S. at 188-90.
170. Carter, 339 F. Supp. at 1397.
171. Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n, 711 F.2d at 856; cf Carter, 339 F. Supp. at 1399
(holding that the NPS may regulate service contract for rental of boats on lake within national
recreation area, even though contract may be entered into outside the area).
172. Washington Tour Guides Ass'n v. National Park Serv., 808 F. Supp. 877, 881 (D.D.C.
1992).
173. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 582 F.2d at 558.
174. Id. at 560-61.
175. Id. at 928; see also Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800,
64,800 (1993) (describing OMB Circular A-25, User Charges, which outlines the scope of user
charges for government services such as utilities).
176. Appeal of R & R Enters., 96 Interior Dec. 313 (1989). See generally PNRL, supra note
1, § 9.03 (discussing the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994)).
177. 36 C.F.R. § 51.1 (1996).
178. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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Competition in Contracting Act or the federal acquisition regulations.' Al-
though the Board of Contract Appeals refused to follow YRT the following
year, its ruling was limited to pre-regulation contacts; those concession agree-
ments were subject to the CDA.IW The Interior Department continues to in-
sist that concessions contracts awarded pursuant to the CPA are not subject to
the Federal Acquisition Regulations applicable in other procurement con-
texts. "' Third, the Comptroller General has concluded that the procedures
mandated by the Competition in Contracting Act'82 do not apply to NPS con-
cessions agreements."
No "better view" of this technical difficulty is readily apparent. The CPA
preceded the CDA and neither mentions the other. NPS concessions agree-
ments clearly are for "the procurement of services" (and often for "the pro-
curement of construction... of real property"), terms defining the scope of
the CDA."' On the other hand, the services are for third parties and the pub-
lic, not for the agency itself. Contrary to the usual service contract, the con-
tractor pays the landlord for the privilege of operating. Concessions agree-
ments are more like leases and permits than ordinary bilateral contracts. On
balance, the NPS should stick to the interpretation in its regulation unless
Congress decides otherwise or a court definitively rules otherwise.
2. The Contractual Relationship
a. General
The CPA grants or clarifies certain rights accruing to those contracting
with the NPS. The Act, adopted in reaction to the disruption in park conces-
sions experienced during World War IH,' was intended to allow concession-
aires a fair return on their investments (but not excessive profits), while insur-
ing that NPS concessions facilities would be affordable and available to ordi-
nary, middle class users. '
Concessionaires contracting with the NPS are better situated than many
parties to private bilateral contracts. Concessionaires have a compensable pos-
sessory interest in improvements they make,'87 are protected against loss of
investment,8 are guaranteed a reasonable opportunity to make a profit,89
179. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366, 392-93 (1993).
180. Appeal of National Park Concessions, Inc., 101 Interior Dec. 92, 106 (1994).
181. See YRT Servs. Corp. 28 Fed. Cl. at 392 (1993); see also Concessions Contracts and
Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,498 (1992) (stating that "concessions contracts are not federal
procurement contracts" and "statutory and regulatory requirements relating to federal procurement
actions do not apply to concessions contracts or permits").
182. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (cod-
ified at scattered sections throughout titles 31 and 41 of the U.S.C).
183. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 392-93 (1993).
184. 41 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994); see PNRL, supra note 1, § 9.03[2].
185. Lake Mohave, 78 F.3d at 1366. The Lake Mohave opinion contains a good description of
the background and legislative history of the CPA. Id. at 1366-67.
186. Id. at 1366.
187. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
188. Id. § 20b(a).
189. Id. § 20b(b).
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have preferential renewal status,"' and may receive preference rights to offer
new services.' Congress in 1965 thought that these rights were necessary to
induce concessionaires into providing adequate service in the adverse commer-
cial conditions under which businesses in remote areas often operate. To
obtain these benefits, a business must enter into an actual written contract with
the Park Service because a contractual relationship will not be implied circum-
stantially. Nevertheless, when a written contract is held invalid, the con-
cessionaire may be entitled to quantum meruit recovery. 94
Concession agreements typically come in two varieties: contracts and
permits called "commercial use licenses." The NPS regulations governing
concession arrangements,'" as revised in 1992,' use the single term "con-
cession contract" to refer in most instances to both contracts and permits."
The agency has not published all of the rules governing the issuance and ad-
ministration of these agreements. The NPS can operate in this somewhat cava-
lier fashion because the courts agree with the agency that the public property
exemption from rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)" 8
allows the NPS to operate informally.'" Despite this judicial stamp of ap-
proval, the agency seems more inclined now than it has been previously to
publish its concession arrangement rules. It continues to maintain, however,
that nothing requires it to do so.'
The NPS concession contract regulations are silent on contract terms and
requirements. Instead, the regulations briefly cover definitions, 0 ' contract
solicitation where no right of preference exists, 2 solicitation when a right of
preference exists, °2 3 preferential rights for new services,'" assignment of
190. Id. § 20d.
191. Id. § 20c.
192. See THE CONSERvATION FOuND., supra note 145, at 178.
193. Yachts Am., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 661 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
194. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 582 F.2d at 560. See generally PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 9
(describing the law of contract remedies).
195. 36 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1996).
196. Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496 (1992).
197. Id. at 40,498.
198. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994).
199. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 776 n.1 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); Clipper Cruise
Line, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1994). A federal magistrate recommended
in 1996, however, that the Park Service's concession contracting manual, NPS-48, be declared
subject to the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the APA and that its provisions not
be applied to concessionaires pending lawful readoption of the manual. National Park Conces-
sions, Inc. v. Kennedy, No. A-93-CA-628JN, 1996 WL 560310, at *51 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26,
1996). (The magistrate's decision did not mention the public property exemption or cite to the
cases construing it.).
200. See Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995); Concessions
Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993).
201. 36 C.F.R. § 51.3 (1996).
202. Id. § 51.4.
203. Id. § 51.5.
204. Id. § 51.6.
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concession contracts,2°' and information collection2" and availability. 7
For new contracts, an NPS prospectus defines the contractual terms and condi-
tions.' The three principal factors used in judging applications are less than
definitive:
(1) The experience and related background of the offeror;
(2) The offeror's fimancial capability; and
(3) Conformance to the terms and conditions of the prospectus in
relation to quality of service to the visitor.'
b. Solicitation and Award of Concession Contracts
i. In the Absence of Preference Renewal Rights
The NPS published a standard form concession contract to guide its offi-
cers in drafting large concession contracts. Each individual contract contains
unique provisions and the agency frequently alters the standard provisions."'
The regulations specify in some detail how the agency must solicit and award
contracts. The procedures differ in some respects depending upon whether an
existing concessionaire holds a right of preference to renew its contract. 1
Where no preference right exists, the agency must advertise through vari-
ous publications, and must issue a prospectus describing the concession opera-
tions sought and the material provisions of the contract."' If exceptional cir-
cumstances exist, the agency may negotiate a concession contract with any
qualified party without public notice or advertising." 3 The principal factors
for selecting the best offer in response to the solicitation include: "[t]he expe-
rience and related background of the offeror, the offeror's financial capability,
and conformance to the terms ... of the prospectus in relation to quality of
service to the visitor.
21 4
The NPS reserves the right to reject all offers and resolicit or cancel a
solicitation at any time. 5 Failure of the selected contractor to execute a final
205. Id. § 51.7.
206. Id. § 51.9.
207. Id. § 51.8.
208. Id. § 51.4(a).
209. Id. § 51.4(b).
210. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
211. See 36 C.F.R. 51.4 and 51.5. The regulations define a right of preference as:
the right of an existing satisfactory concessioner to a preference in the extension or
renewal of its contract or a new contract concerning all or part of substantially the same
accommodations, facilities and services as provided by concessioner under the terms of
its existing contract if the [NPS] Director chooses to continue to authorize all or part of
such accommodations, facilities and services in an extended, renewed or new contract as
necessary and appropriate concession activities.
36 C.F.R. § 51.3(b) (1996).
212. Id. § 51.4(a).
213. Id. § 51.4(f).
214. Id. § 51.4(b).
215. Id. § 51.4(c).
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contract within the time specified by the NPS results in cancellation and
resolicitation." 6 The NPS must forward concession contracts with anticipated
annual gross receipts of $100,000 or more or for a five-year term or more to
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Com-
mittee on Natural Resources before execution."7
The NPS may terminate the award of a concession contract before execu-
tion by the government and either resolicit or cancel the solicitation. No offer-
or obtains compensable or other legal rights if a contract that has been solicit-
ed is subsequently resolicited or canceled."' In Seva Resorts,"9 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Secretary acted within the scope of the CPA when a con-
tract signed by the concessionaire but not the government, due to fears relating
to the concessionaire's ability to perform, was canceled."'
The most comprehensive treatment of the NPS concession contracting
process, the 1993 YRT Services Corporation concessions case,2 ' occurred in
the absence of a preference renewal right. The Yosemite concessionaire,
MCA, received much criticism after it became known that in 1992 MCA paid
the government only three-fourths of one percent of its gross revenues of over
ninety-two million dollars."' The long-time concessionaire, now under for-
eign ownership, bowed to public pressure and agreed to relinquish the prof-
itable concession."'
With preference renewal no longer in the picture, the contracting process
was opened to all. The NPS conducted the search in two phases. It first re-
quired applicants to show that they were managerially competent and had
equity capital of at least twelve million dollars." 4 Thereafter, the applicants
responded in writing to the NPS Statement of Requirements (SOR), a long
invitation to bid containing sixteen evaluation criteria.' Some of the criteria
were quite broad and vague, for example, "the extent to which the [bidding]
entity reflects an understanding of the [NPSJ mission and a concessioner's role
in carrying out that mission." ' The process of evaluating submissions is
outlined in an agency manual, NPS-48.2' Evaluation panels determine
whether bidders meet each criterion, prepare a matrix, and, based on an as-
sessment of the benefits to the public and the impact on the park of each pro-
216. Id. § 51.4(d).
217. 16 U.S.C. § la-7(c) (1994); 36 C.F.R. § 51.4(d).
218. 36 C.F.R. § 51.4(d).
219. Seva Resorts, Inc. v. Hodel, 876 F.2d 1394, 1399-1400 (9th Cit. 1989).
220. Seva Resorts, Inc., 876 F.2d at 1400-01.
221. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 366 (1993).
222. See Carl Nolte, New Firm Replaces Curry Co. as Yosemite Concessionaire, L.A. DAILY
NEws, Oct. 1, 1993, at N7.
223. See Frank Clifford, Curry Co. Turns Over Yosemite Concessions Parks, L.A. TIMEs, Oct.
2, 1993, at A18.
224. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 372.
225. Id. at 374-76 (listing evaluation criteria).
226. Id. at 376.
227. Id. at 372. "NPS-48 is a 900-page concession management manual containing detailed
instructions for how to judge comparability" of concessionaire proposals, including rates. Lake
Mohave, 78 F.3d at 1363 n.3. The NPS has published in the Federal Register the chapter of NPS-
48 that governs the establishment of rates charged by concessionaires. Concessions Rate Adminis-
tration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993). See infra Part II.B.2.d.
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posal, recommend to the executing official which bid to accept.' The NPS
contracting process is relatively flexible, with criteria other than fees likely to
be determinative in the semi-subjective evaluations."2 9
The NPS decided that only one bidder, Delaware North, met all sixteen
criteria and awarded it the concession.23 YRT, a disappointed bidder,
brought suit for an injunction, claiming that the process was flawed and the
decision arbitrary.f' In a lengthy opinion, Judge Horn of the Court of Feder-
al Claims rejected those allegations. Characterizing CPA agreements as
"unique,""23 the judge opined that "because the criteria for determining bid-
der responsibility are not readily susceptible to reasoned judicial review and
essentially involve a matter of business judgment,... affirmative determina-
tions of responsibility generally will not be overturned absent allegations of
fraud or bad faith."233 In the end, the decision was relatively easy since the
losing bidder did not demonstrate the requisite capital and sought to change
the proposal terms. YRT also did not prove any of the four factors set forth in
the earlier Keco234 decision for overturning a contract award on the ground
that the government treated the bidder arbitrarily: "(1) whether the government
procuring officials acted in bad faith.. .;235 (2) whether there was a reason-
able basis for the government's decision; (3) the degree of discretion given to
the procurement officials by applicable statutes and regulations; and (4) wheth-
er government officials violated pertinent statutes or regulations ...."236
The YRT decision demonstrates that, at least when an existing concession-
aire is not entitled to preferential treatment in the contract renewal process, the
NPS has discretion to choose among prospective concessionaires analogous to
the freedom a private business has in selecting its contractors. Absent proof of
a violation of agency regulations, unsuccessful bidders will have a difficult
time foisting themselves upon an unwilling NPS.
ii. Monopolies and Preference Renewal Rights
Concessionaires, at the Secretary's option, may be given monopolies and
preferential contract renewal rights. 7 The Secretary appears to have virtual
carte blanche to grant long-term monopolies of public services in national
parks.238 In Lake Berryessa,239 for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
228. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 372.
229. See Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,500 (1992) (stating
"franchise fees will continue to be only a secondary factor in the evaluation of offers.").
230. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 380-81.
231. Id. at 369.
232. Id. at 393.
233. Id. at 394.
234. Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (1974).
235. Cf National Park Concessions, Inc. v. Kennedy, No. A-93-CA-628JN, 1996 WL 560310,
at *15 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1996).
236. YRT Servs Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387.
237. 16 U.S.C. §§ 20c, 20d.
238. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 20c). But see Willow Beach Resort, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 241, 245
(1984) (rejecting the argument that preference renewal right gave existing contract holder a mo-
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government's action requiring the removal of all docks and structures from a
federal lake except those of the licensed concessionaires." NPS regulations
limit the circumstances in which concession contracts may be assigned.'
The CPA requires the Interior Secretary to "encourage continuity of oper-
ation and facilities and services by giving preference in the renewal of con-
tracts or permits... to the concessioners who have performed their obliga-
tions under prior contracts or permits to the satisfaction of the Secretary." 42
The Secretary, "in his discretion," may extend or renew a contract or permit or
grant a new contract or permit to the same concessionaire upon termination of
a previous contract or permit."3 This opportunity to provide additional ser-
vices usually takes the form of a right of first refusal.'" One court has inter-
preted these provisions as making the grant of a right of preference for new or
renewal contracts mandatory, while the decision whether to renew is discre-
tionary." In other words, the government has the discretion not to renew at
all, but if it does, it must afford a right of preference to a concessionaire who
has performed satisfactorily. The regulations track the statute by distinguishing
between a "right of preference""M and a "preferential right."247 The former
applies to renewal of existing concessions and the latter refers to "new or
additional services. 'a2
When the agency considers renewal of an existing concession, the Secre-
tary must publish a notice of intent to grant or renew concession contracts and
invite bids. 249 The preference renewal right runs only to concessionaires who
have performed "to the satisfaction of the Secretary."' Thus, before issuing
a prospectus, the NPS must determine, based on annual evaluations during the
term of the contract, whether the existing concessionaire has performed in a
satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory manner. If the agency rates the
concessionaire's performance as unsatisfactory in the year preceding issuance
of the prospectus, or marginal during the two preceding years, the
nopoly on the performance of marine services on portion of the Colorado River).
239. Lake Berryessa Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1978).
240. Id. at 270 (holding that the action did not amount to a taking).
241. 36 C.F.R. § 51.7 (1996); see also Final Revision of National Park Service Standard
Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg. 3140, 3147 (1993) (explaining that "there is no inherent right
to assign or sell to a third party the rights and obligations of a govemment contract").
242. 16 U.S.C. § 20d.
243. Id.
244. See S. REP. No. 89-765, at 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3492-93
(The security of tenure provided by preference renewal rights "permit[s] both the government and
the concessionaire to know where they will stand in the future and thus to assure continuity of
park operations.").
245. Current-Jacks Fork Canoe Rental Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Mo.
1985). The court disavowed dicta to the contrary in Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711
F.2d 852, 858 n.8 (8th Cir. 1983). See Current-Jacks, 603 F. Supp. at 426-27.
246. 36 C.F.R. § 51.3(h).
247. Id. § 51.3(c).
248. Id.
249. 16 U.S.C. § 20d (1994). The NPS invites bids only from those within a "zone of active
consideration" for award of a contract. See Washington Tour Guides Ass'n v. NPS, 808 F. Supp.
877, 882 (D.D.C. 1992).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 20d.
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concessionaire's overall performance is unsatisfactory."' If the
concessionaire's overall performance over the term of the contract was satis-
factory, it is entitled to preference in the renewal of its contract.52 "[I1f,
after a prospectus which recognizes a right of preference is issued," a conces-
sionaire receives an unsatisfactory rating in an annual evaluation, the NPS
"shall cancel the solicitation or contract award and reissue the solicitation
without a right of preference." 3 A concessionaire with an overall perfor-
mance rating that is less than satisfactory is not entitled to a right of prefer-
ence.
254
Concessionaires must keep detailed records documenting contractual per-
formance.5 Some of these records are available to the public," 6 although
information concerning profits, salaries, or expenses of existing concession-
aires need not be disclosed. 7 NPS regulations additionally mandate contin-
uous, complex reporting on all phases of concessionaire operations and autho-
rize periodic audits."
Satisfactory performance does not automatically entitle the existing con-
cessionaire to the contract. The incumbent must meet the Secretary's contract
bid criteria; it has no right to renewal on terms identical with the. original
contract, but is limited to an opportunity to meet the terms of competing pro-
posals. 9 More specifically, a concessionaire with a right of preference must
submit a timely offer which meets the terms and conditions of the prospectus.
If the concessionaire fails to do so, its right of preference is waived, and the
agency must award the contract to the party submitting the best responsive
offer.2" If the agency received no other responsive offer, it may resolicit
without affording any right of preference, unless the resolicitation consists of
terms and conditions that differ substantially from the terms of the initial pro-
spectus.26" ' The same procedures apply where a concessionaire with a right of
preference receives a contract but fails to execute it within the time period
established by the NPS.262
The regulations require equal evaluation of all responsive offers received
where a right of preference applies.263 If a person other than the holder of
251. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(a).
252. National Park Concessions, Inc., 1996 WL 560310, at *11-'12 (ruling by a federal mag-
istrate that issuance of a marginal rating was arbitrary given the concessionaire's minor transgres-
sions).
253. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(a).
254. Id.
255. 16 U.S.C. § 20g.
256. 36 C.F.R. § 51.8.
257. Concession Contracts and Permits, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,496, 40,502 (1992).
258. 36 C.F.R. § 51.9.
259. Canyoneers, Inc. v. Hodel, 756 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Lewis v. Babbitt,
998 F.2d 880, 882 (10th Cir. 1993) (declining to decide whether the concessionaire with a prefer-
ence right must match an unresponsive proposal). Requiring the concessionaire to match an unre-
sponsive proposal would make little sense. A non-responsive proposal should be treated as no
proposal at all.
260. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(c).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. § 51.5(d).
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the right of preference submits the best offer, that party gains entitlement to
the contract, provided the agency provides the existing concessionaire an op-
portunity to amend its offer to meet the terms and conditions of the best of-
fer.2" In Hotcaveg,2" the disappointed incumbent bidder argued that this
regulation conflicted with Congress's desire to encourage the continuity of
concessionaires. The district court, however, upheld the Secretary's decision to
cut off the incumbent's preference renewal right due to the unresponsive na-
ture of its bid, stating that "[a]lthough continuity is a goal, it cannot be sought
recklessly."2' If the existing concessionaire submits on a timely basis an
amended offer that is at least substantially equal to the best offer and the
existing concessionaire is capable of carrying out its terms, it is entitled to the
contract.
267
Preferential fights are governed by different rules. Those rights apply
when the NPS decides to contract for new or additional accommodations,
facilities, and services of generally the same character as provided by an exist-
ing concessions contract, and the existing concessionaire by contract has a
fight to provide those additional services.2' In those circumstances, the
agency must describe the new or additional services and the terms and condi-
tions upon which they are to be provided, and give the existing concessionaire
a reasonable opportunity to offer to provide the services.2" If the existing
concessionaire makes such an offer, the procedures that apply to contracts not
subject to preference rights apply. 270 In Willow Beach Resort,27' the court
held that the NPS did not violate a concessionaire's preferential fights by re-
jecting its "non-responsive" proposal and awarding a contract for new services
to another company.
The dividing line between a right of preference applicable to renewal of
existing concessions and a preferential fight applicable to new or additional
services is not always clear. In Hamilton Stores,2 3 two operators held con-
cession contracts within Yellowstone National Park. The performance of one
operator was deemed unsatisfactory, and the NPS assigned its operations to a
new concessionaire.274 When the new concessionaire began expanding its
services, the remaining old concessionaire objected, claiming that its fight of
preference had not been observed in the original assignment. The Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1991 affirmed a judgment dismissing the claim because the expanded
services were not new or additional, but rather a continuation of existing con-
cessions, and the claimant's contract limited the preference to renewal of the
264. Id.
265. Hotcaveg v. Kennedy, 883 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 72 F.3d 133 (unpub-
lished table decision), 1995 WL 739991 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 1995).
266. Hotcaveg, 883 F. Supp. at 430.
267. 36 C.F.R. § 51.5(d).
268. Id. § 51.6.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Willow Beach Resort, Inc. v. United States, 5 Ci. Ct. 241 (1984).
272. Willow Beach, 5 Cl. Ct. at 245.
273. Hamilton Stores, Inc. v. Hodel, 925 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1991).
274. Hamilton Stores, 925 F.2d at 1274-75.
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same 275same concessions.
The CPA does not provide disappointed bidders with a private right of
action, but they can seek judicial review pursuant to the APA.2 76 Failure to
follow solicitation and award procedures requires remand for reconsidera-
tion 7 Reversal on substantive grounds creates more difficulties. In the 1977
Fort Sumter Tours case,278 the court enjoined the Secretary from awarding a
contract to a competitor of the incumbent on the basis that the procedures used
raised a substantial question whether the NPS adequately observed the
incumbent's preference rights.279 Fort Sumter Tours notwithstanding, judicial
review of contractor selection tends to be deferential."s The disappointed
bidder bears the burden of showing that the agency's selection was irrational
or involved statutory or regulatory violations, and therefore that the agency
breached its duty to consider the proposal fairly and honestly."1 Proof that
the procuring officials acted in bad faith or that no reasonable basis for the
award existed satisfies that burden.2
c. Possessory Interests
Under the CPA, a concessionaire has "all incidents of title" to structures,
fixtures, or similar improvements constructed or acquired by it "except legal
title," which is retained in the United States.283 Equitable title vests in the
concessionaire even if not recognized in the contract.2' Legislation adopted
in 1986 requires that all concession contracts provide that termination for
cause extinguishes all possessory interests beyond depreciated book value.S
If the government otherwise terminates the contract, the concessionaire re-
ceives entitlement either to an agreed amount or to "sound value ... not to
275. Id. at 1281-82.
276. Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. National Parks & Con-
servation Ass'n v. Hodel, 679 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (asserting that there is no private
right of action for the public to challenge concession contracts).
277. See Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981).
278. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Andrus, 564 F.2d 1119 (4th Cir. 1977).
279. Fort Sumter Tours, 564 F.2d at 1125. The NPS apparently must provide a copy of a
competing applicant's proposal to an incumbent seeking to exercise its preference rights, although
the agency may delete confidential financial information and trade secrets. Lewis v. Lujan, 826 F.
Supp. 1302, 1308 (D. Wyo. 1992), affd, 998 F.2d. 880 (loth Cir. 1993).
280, Piscataway Co. v. United States, 861 F.2d 265 (unpublished table decision), 1988 WL
109267 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a statute authorizing the NPS to cooperate with the State of
Maryland to promote preservation of the Piscataway National Park authorized the agency to enter
into a cooperative agreement with the State to renovate and manage a marina instead of renewing
a contract with a former concessionaire). Judicial review of a preaward NPS procurement decision
is particularly limited in scope. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 386-87 (citing RADVA Corp. v.
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 812, 818 (1989), affd, 914 F.2d 271 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
281. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387 (citing Quality Transp. Servs., Inc. v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 276, 281 (1987)).
282. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. Cl. at 387 (citing Keco Indus.; Inc. v. United States, 492 F.2d
1200, 1203-04 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
283. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
284. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
285. Act of Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-247 (1986); Act of Oct. 30,
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-247 (1986).
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exceed fair market value. 286 A 1981 Court of Claims decision confirmed
that "sound value" is not book value. 7
A pre-CPA decision illustrated the meaning of "book value.""2 8 The
plaintiff's concession agreement terminated in 1958; it provided that the plain-
tiff had a possessory interest (not legal title) and that upon termination, the
Secretary would compensate the concessionaire "for its possessory interest in
such improvements in an amount not less than their book value." ' Plaintiff
claimed that he was entitled to replacement cost as compensation. The court
rejected this claim, holding that the concessionaire was due only the depreci-
ated value of his original investment, roughly 1/40 of what he sought.' °
Contract principles, not statutory provisions, determined the outcome.29 '
After enactment of the CPA, the Court of Claims reached a different re-
sult in Fordyce,' where the contract also specified that compensation for
extinguishment of the possessory interest would be "not less than book val-
ue. 293 The government argued for book value as the standard, but the court
determined instead that book value set only the minimum, and that the "sound
value" rule of the CPA established the appropriate standard.294 The court
refused to speculate on how to calculate "sound value," except that the statute
specifies that it cannot exceed fair market value. Because book value is subject
to accounting manipulation, sound value is undefined, and market value is an
empty abstraction in the absence of a market, the interaction of contractual and
statutory provisions is unnecessarily confused and confusing.
On remand, the lower court determined "sound value."2" The statute
says that sound value shall be "determined upon the basis of reconstruction
cost less depreciation evidenced by [the improvement's] condition and pro-
spective serviceability in comparison with a new unit of like kind, but not to
exceed fair market value."2 This standard differs drastically from "book
value" since it ignores depreciation of the asset claimed for tax purposes and
instead deducts from reconstruction (or replacement) cost physical depreciation
of the improvement. In Fordyce, reconstruction cost would have been high,
and deduction of physical depreciation of the massive bathhouse at issue
would still leave a substantial sum, an amount far in excess of what the
government's experts testified was fair market value.297 Plaintiff argued that
fair market value did not apply in this instance because there was no market.
The court disagreed, holding that a bathhouse was not a "special-use property"
lacking a clear market such as a sewer or a church, because "market
286. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
287. Fordyce v. United States, 650 F.2d 1191 (Ct. Ci. 1981).
288. Bishop v. United States, 164 Ct. CI. 717 (1964).
289. Bishop, 164 Ct. CI. at 722.
290. Id. at 737-38.
291. See also Schoeffel v. United States, 193 Ct. CI. 923 (1971).
292. Fordyce, 650 F.2d at 1195.
293. Id. at 1194. Most pre-CPA contracts specified book value as the standard.
294. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
295. Fordyce v. United States, 7 CI. CL 591, 600 (1985).
296. 16 U.S.C. § 20e.
297. Fordyce, 7 Cl. Ct. at 594-96.
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comparables" existed in the area."' "Highest and best use" determines mar-
ket value.' 9 Holding that the highest use for a bathhouse was as an office
building (although the NPS intended to convert it to a visitor center), the court
accepted the government's valuation and awarded $152,000.3'0
When the NPS amended its standard form concession contract in
1993,-" it altered the method for measuring the compensation due a conces-
sionaire for its possessory interest by replacing sound value with a redefined
"fair value. ' '3" Instead of basing compensation on the appreciated value of
the improvements, the new standard contract authorizes a calculation based on
the actual cost of constructing an improvement, less straight line depreciation
over the estimated useful life of the improvement according to Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles. According to the NPS, sound value compensa-
tion likely provides higher compensation to the concessionaire than the new
fair value measure, although the latter continues to ensure that the concession
holder will be able to recover the investment it makes in a concession build-
ing. The NPS explained its jettisoning of the sound value compensation provi-
sion contained in the old contract form because sound value compensation
imposes unnecessary financial liability on the government, inhibits fair com-
petition in the award of concession contracts, and impairs the NPS's ability to
undertake changes in the location and uses of concession facilities required for
preservation of park resources and their enjoyment by park visitors. 3 The
latter adverse effect occurred because if the NPS sought relocation of a con-
cession facility, it had to pay compensation in the amount of the sound value
of the structures removed.'
d. Opportunity to Profit and Franchise Fees
Loss-of-investment protection is more tenuous than protection of posses-
sory interests. At the Secretary's discretion, the contract may include a clause
providing for protection against loss of investment in structures, fixtures, im-
provements, supplies, and other tangible property. However, protection is af-
forded only against subsequent discretionary secretarial actions or policies.05
Additionally, the CPA requires the Secretary to exercise his authority in a
manner consistent with a reasonable opportunity for the concessionaire to real-
ize a profit commensurate with the capital invested and the obligations as-
sumed.3 6 While this provision prevents the Secretary from sabotaging or
298. Id. at 598-99.
299. Id. at 599.
300. Id. at 600-01.
301. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
302. The new calculation methodology has been challenged as inconsistent with the CPA in a
suit brought by the National Park Hospitality Association. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACrING,
supra note 116.
303. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg. at
3142-43.
304. Id. at 3145.
305. 16 U.S.C. § 20b(a).
306. Id. § 20b(b).
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undermining the concessionaire's operation, it does not guarantee a profit, only
an opportunity to realize a profit.3"
The CPA also governs the establishment and adjustment of franchise fees.
Franchise fees must be determined based on consideration of the "probable
value" of the contract to the concessionaire.' Probable value "is the oppor-
tunity for net profit in relation to both gross receipts and capital invested.""'3°
The government must subordinate consideration of its revenue to the objec-
tives of protecting the area related to the contract and providing adequate
services for visitors at reasonable rates." ' Contracts must provide for recon-
sideration of franchise fees at least once every five years.3" '
The Concession Guidelines contained in NPS-48" 2 establish a methodol-
ogy for calculating concessionaire franchise fees.3"3 Chapter eighteen of
NPS-48, which governs the approval of concessionaire rates, has been pub-
lished in full in the Federal Register.3"4 The manual describes the objective
of rate approval as "assur[ing] that concessioner rates and charges to the pub-
lic are commensurate with the level of services and facilities provided, as well
as reasonable and comparable with similar services and facilities provided by
the private sector.
'315
Rates are established pursuant to one of seven methods. The preferred
method is a "review of similar services." This method applies where compa-
rable businesses exist in a competitive market and focuses on the quality of
service and amenities in establishing prices.3"6 Its purpose is to offset the
possibility of monopoly pricing by concessionaires.3"7 The second method,
"simplified review of similar services," is a quick, relatively cost-efficient
method of review which is available for low volume sales when a service is
not covered by the full review method.3"' Simplified review of similar ser-
vices entails a comparison of the concessionaire's prices with those of selected
private businesses located, if possible, on non-federal lands.319 Third,
307. Yachts Am., Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 656, 662 (Fed. Cir. 1985); National Parks &
Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1976); cf. National Park Concessions,
Inc. v. Kennedy, Civ. No. A-93-CA-628 JN, 1996 WL 560310 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 1996) (deter-
mining that NPS denied concessionaire reasonable opportunity to earn a profit by refusing to
allow it to use Special Account Fee fund to pay for improvements and by failing to approve its
food rates).




312. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
313. Lake Mojave, 78 F.3d at 1363 n.3. The manual assesses the comparability of a
concessionaire's rates with those of other facilities under similar conditions.
314. Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800 (1993). But a federal
magistrate found that the Park Service did not comply with the APA's notice and comment
rulemaking procedures in issuing NPS-48 and recommended that the agency be enjoined from
applying its provisions to a concessionaire until that defect was cured. Kennedy, 1996 WL
560310, at *50.
315. Concessions Rate Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. at 64,800.
316. Id. at 64,802.
317. Id. at 64,803.
318. Id. at 64,802-03.
319. Id. at 64,811.
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"specified rate on authorization" is used when the business involves a limited
number of unique items or services (such as seaplane excursions, horseback
rides and mountain-climbing), a simple rate structure, and no comparable busi-
nesses are readily available.32°
"Merchandise pricing" is the preferred method for establishing retail pric-
es for goods (e.g., curios and groceries) in which there exists the industry
practice of setting prices according to the desired margin for a product line by
a percent markup.31 Merchandise pricing is not permitted for service-related
businesses in which quality of service and amenities are important factors
(e.g., restaurants, hotels, transportation, marina operations, etc.). 3" If a high-
ly competitive market exists in the immediate vicinity of the park and the
pricing of unique items (e.g., handicrafts) is routinely negotiated between the
vendor and the customer, the "competitive market declaration" method may be
used.323 The competitive market method reduces the agency's administrative
burden in determining rates because competition forces the concessionaire to
charge comparable rates.324 The "indexing" method is used in conjunction
with, or subsequent to, rates established by another method. It is especially
useful for interim rate approvals and situations when the agency faces manage-
ment constraints on time, travel, or money.32 The final authorized method of
establishing prices is by "financial analysis." This method involves a process
by which the agency determines on an ad hoc basis if the prices are compara-
ble with the industry after considering and exhausting all other methods.326
Rate approval decisions may be appealed to the Regional Director.327
A concessionaire unsuccessfully challenged the application of both the
CPA's franchise fee provisions and NPS-48 in the 1995 Fort Sumter Tours
case.32 The Secretary notified the concessionaire (FST) that it was consid-
ering renegotiation of the franchise fee pursuant to the CPA. Instead of negoti-
ating with the government, FST filed a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine its rights under the contract. After the government increased the fee,
FST's action became an administrative appeal of the increase decision. FST
argued first that the CPA prohibits the NPS from considering profits when
determining franchise fees. The court found this argument to be inconsistent
with the plain language of the CPA.329 FST also claimed that NPS-48
impermissibly sought to limit concessionaire. profits, but the court determined
that the function of the guidelines was to provide a framework for the report-
ing of financial data and the determination of an appropriate franchise fee.
Contrary to FST's contention, the agency properly used a comparison of the
320. Id. at 64,803, 64,813.
321. Id. at 64,803.
322. Id. at 64,814.
323. Id. at 64,803.
324. Id. at 64,815.
325. Id. at 64,803.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 64,802.
328. Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1327 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct 1848 (1996).
329. Fort Sumter Tours, 66 F.3d at 1329 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 20b(b), (d)).
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concessionaire's returns with the profits of other companies in the industry as
a factor in determining an appropriate fee. 33 According to FST, the CPA
authorizes unilateral reconsideration but not adjustment of franchise fees. The
court, however, deferred to the Secretary's contrary interpretation because a
provision authorizing unilateral reconsideration would be meaningless in the
absence of the ability to adjust. 33' Finally, the court rejected FST's claim that
the contract provision relating to adjustment of franchise fees was so broad
that it afforded the government "an absolute right to sabotage the entire con-
tract. '332 The contract included sufficient procedural constraints and safe-
guards to "provide a check on random adjustment of fees. 333
Similar in effect was the 1982 Yosemite Park34 decision. The NPS
raised the rates it charged its concessionaire for electricity, using a different
computation based on comparable private costs. The court agreed with the
agency that this readjustment was "reasonable" within the meaning of the
contract.
According to Interior Department investigators in their testimony before
Congress in 1990, the Interior Department is losing tens of millions of dollars
each year as a result of poorly drafted concession contracts.333 The inadequa-
cy of the fee provisions of these contracts is even more troublesome because
there is no private right of action under the CPA to challenge a concession
contract on the ground that it charges unreasonably low fees. 31 Similarly,
members of the public may not sue for breach of a concession contract as
third party beneficiaries.337
In 1993, the NPS amended the standard concession contract that provides
a guide for the execution of large concession contracts. 3 ' Among other
things, the 1993 contract reduces the compensation to which concessionaires
are entitled upon termination of possessory interests.339 In 1995, the NPS an-
nounced that it had begun a review of all of its policies concerning concession
management activities.34 In the interim, it eliminated a policy (set forth in
330.' Id. at 1329. The concessionaire argued that such a comparison would tailor profits to the
average profitability of the industry, thereby encouraging mediocrity and discouraging efficiency.
Id.
331. Id. at 1330.
332. Id. at 1331.
333. Id. at 1332. The concessionaire argued that the contract was inconsistent with the com-
mon law of contracts because it allowed for modification without consideration from the party
opposing the modification. But the court regarded a fee adjustment as an action that takes place
pursuant to the terms of the contract itself, rather than as a modification of the contract. Id.
334. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. United States, 686 F.2d 925 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
335. John Lancaster, Profiteering in the Parks?; Concessionaires' Contracts Cost U.S. Tens
of Millions, Hill Is Told, WASH. POST, May 25, 1990, at A19.
336. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Hodel, 679 F. Supp. 49, 54 (D.D.C.
1987)(citing Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1981)).
337. Id. at 54 (citing Berberich v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 652, 655 (1984), affd mem., 770
F.2d 179 (unpublished table decision) (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
338. Final Revision of National Park Service Standard Concession Contract, 58 Fed. Reg.
3140 (1993).
339. See supra Part H.B.2.c.
340. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995); Concession Con-
tract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 3435 (1995).
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Chapter 24 of NPS-48) which limited a concessionaire's franchise fee to 50%
of its pre-tax, pre-franchise fee profit.34' Although the policy was intended as
a guideline to aid in the establishment of fees, it was interpreted as setting a
firm cap. The agency conceded that the policy lacked either an empirical or a
theoretical justification and that it could result in the recovery of fees that
amount to less than probable value. According to the NPS, the policy favored
large concessionaires and reduced the fees payable to the government over a
five-year period by as much as $1.8 million on one concession contract
alone.342 Franchise fees may now exceed the old fifty percent figure, provid-
ed the amount is otherwise consistent with a reasonable opportunity for profit
and with the objectives of providing adequate and appropriate service to park
visitors.343 Despite the change in policy, concessionaires With less than
$100,000 in annual gross receipts must still pay only two percent of those
receipts as fees. 3"
The 1995 interim policy change also clarified that the NPS need not ap-
prove an interim rate schedule. This clarification addressed the practice of
some concessionaires of accepting deposits for individual reservations without
securing the rates for the facility or service reserved, but including in the con-
firmation notice a caveat that rates are subject to change without notice. This
policy had led to increased rates that were not always justified.345
Finally, the NPS eliminated the interim right to appeal the selection of
comparable businesses. Pursuant to the CPA,3  the NPS determines rates
primarily by comparison with the rates charged for facilities and services of
comparable character under similar conditions, giving consideration to factors
such as the length of the season, peakloads, average percentage of occupancy,
accessibility, availability and cost of labor and materials, and type of
patronage.3 7
The pre-1995 procedures allowed concessionaires to appeal the selection
of comparables 3" and, if that appeal failed, to file a second appeal of the ap-
proved rate. A concessionaire whose appeal of the approved rate was rejected
could also appeal the basis of the comparables selected. The elimination of the
"comparable appeal" was meant to remove that duplicative appeal and expe-
dite the appeals process.349
Commentators have criticized Park Service concessions policy on the
grounds that relationships are too cozy, concessionaires are over-insulated
from competition, and commercial development is harmful to park purpos-
es.3"' Given the extremely broad secretarial latitude to regulate concessions
341. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,469 (1995).
342. Concession Contract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
343. Id.
344. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 37,470.
345. Id.
346. 16 U.S.C. § 20b(c).
347. Revision of Certain Concession Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3435.
348. "The selection of comparables is the cornerstone of the entire process." Concessions Rate
Administration Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 64,800, 64,803 (1993).
349. Concession Contract Policies, 60 Fed. Reg. at 3436.
350. See, e.g., Mantell, supra note 145; A. RUNTE, supra note 147.
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in existing law, and judicial reluctance to interfere with exercise of that discre-
tion (except to require procedural compliance), the issue is more political than
legal. This Part has described some recent NPS reforms intended to enhance
competition and the Park Service's share of concession revenues. Nevertheless,
if the law of national park concessions is to be changed in anything other than
an incremental manner, park advocates will have to convince Congress to
change it.
III. REFORM OF NATIONAL PARK CONCESSIONS LAW AND POLICY: THE
QUESTIONS
Evidently, no one who is willing to put his or her opinions in print is
satisfied with NPS concessions law and policy. Park users, environmentalists,
concessions contractors, academics, the General Accounting Office (GAO),
legislators, and the NPS itself-all decry one or more aspects of the current
situation. Nearly all concerned agree that some share of concession revenues
ought to be returned to the national park system for maintenance and other
needs. Most seem to agree that the anti-competitive aspects of the current
system deprive the national park system of needed revenue while making ser-
vice improvement more difficult. Preferential rights and possessory interests in
particular are the objects of critical outrage. Most commentators apparently
accept the appropriateness and desirability of contracting with private entities
for visitor services, but many disagree on the optimum degree of facility de-
velopment. In the overall scheme of things, overcrowding (which may contrib-
ute to overuse of park resources) and facility deterioration are more important
than return to the government, but the latter problem certainly is not negligi-
ble.
A. A Hierarchy of Reform Questions
The present system, whereby the NPS chooses private entities to provide
visitor services, began as a pragmatic administrative solution and later was
embodied into the CPA. Interested parties now are virtually unanimous that
the CPA is inadequate and should be heavily amended if not repealed. The
reform fervor naturally raises a galaxy of questions. Competing versions of
pending concessions reform legislation provide conflicting answers to some
but not all such questions.
In assessing Park Service concessions law and policy, the issues can be
divided into three categories: preliminary, greater, and lesser. The preliminary
questions are very basic and can generally be answered without analysis.
Those questions include:35" '
351. Another preliminary question is whether Congress should have a uniform concessions
policy for all land management agencies. The concessions reform bill introduced by Rep. Hansen
in 1995, which is discussed below, would have put all of the concession-granting federal land
management agencies under a single legal regime. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995). Rep. Meyers'
competing bill, also discussed below, is confined to the National Park System. H.R. 773, 104th
Cong. (1995). The other federal land management agencies have strongly resisted a unitary sys-
tem, claiming that their situations and practices are necessarily and rightfully different. Uniformity
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Should the park system have any developed visitor facilities?
Assuming some agreed level of facility development, should that
development, maintenance, and operation be carried out by private or
public entities?
The "greater" questions that any reform effort must answer, explicitly or
implicitly, go to the basic structure and outlines of a new concessions regime.
They include:
What are the optimum degrees of recreation facility development and
provision of recreational services in national parks?
Are special incentives still necessary to induce businesses to bid for
NPS concession contracts?
To which uses should concession franchise fees (and entrance fees)
be directed?
To what extent, if at all, should the United States rely on private
entrepreneurs to provide capital improvements?
Which entities should be responsible for which aspects of setting
prices for tourist services?
Should the NPS be required to comply with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act in promulgating concessions regulations?
Should NPS concession contract mechanisms be required to comply
with all or some of the panoply of federal laws otherwise applicable
to government contracts?
To what extent should NPS concessions law be spelled out by statute
rather than delegated to administrative discretion?
Should NPS concessions contracts take the form of arms-length busi-
ness transactions?
Answers to the greater questions will, to an extent, dictate the answers to
the lesser questions. The characterization as lesser questions does not indicate
importance. However, because they relate more to means than to ends, they
necessarily have a lower priority. Assuming that the initial premises will lead
to a concessions system resembling, at least in broad outline, the current sys-
tem, the lesser questions will include:
Should preference rights to renewal or to provision of additional
services be allowed, and, if so, to what extent?
Should the NPS treat large and small concessionaires differently, and,
if so, to what extent?
When, if ever, are departures from competitive bidding justified?
has obvious benefits to all concerned, but some of those differences are unquestionably real. Al-
though uniform concessions policy is beyond the scope of this article, the answer ought to depend
upon whether the benefits to be derived from the simplicity of administering a uniform system
would exceed the costs of applying such a system to agency contracts not well suited to the tem-
plate chosen. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Statement of David Unger, Forest
Service, Before the Subeomm. on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands of the House Comm.
on Resources, July 25, 1995.
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Should the value of improvements be measured by straight-line de-
preciation or by some other method?
Should franchise fees be based on percentages of gross receipts or on
net profits or on some other basis?
What appeal mechanism, if any, would best provide an efficient
means of dispute resolution?
What mechanism will provide the best evaluation of concessionaire
performance?
Members of Congress, the GAO, NPS personnel, current concessionaires,
the National Parks and Conservation Association, and many more groups and
individuals have debated some of these issues at length over the past decade in
several forums. The remainder of this section takes up each of the foregoing
questions in the context of that continuing debate. Because the answer to any
of those questions necessarily implicates a value judgment of a policy or polit-
ical nature, there necessarily is no single right answer. Sharply differing ver-
sions of reform legislation were introduced in 1994 and 1995. Representative
Meyers's (R. Kan.) 1995 bill, H.R. 773,352 is the same as a bill that passed
overwhelmingly in the House in 1994 but did not survive to enactment.
353
Representative Hansen (R. Utah) introduced a competing measure, H.R. 2028,
in 1995 that is far more favorable to existing concessionaires.3 4 It formed
the basis for the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995,'31
which was passed by both houses of Congress as part of a reconciliation bud-
get bill but was vetoed by President Clinton. 356 The two bills together offer a
starting point for analysis of reform possibilities and approaches. The follow-
ing subsections summarize the major arguments and positions adduced by
legislators, commentators, witnesses, etc., and the authors will also assess the
merits of the competing positions. The next subsection examines the two
"preliminary" questions, and following subsections attempt to provide reason-
able answers or approaches to the "greater" and "lesser" questions identified
above.
B. The Preliminary Questions
1. Outlaw Facility Development?
It is far too late in history to argue that national parks should be left total-
ly in a state of nature, without any facilities or amenities for human visitors.
National parks were established for present enjoyment as well as preserva-
352. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. (1995).
353. Statement of Rep. Jan Meyers Before the Subcomm. on National Parks, Forests, and
Public Lands of the House Comm. on Resources, July 25, 1995, 1995 WL 443431.
354. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. (1995).
355. See H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1, at 581 (1995).
356. President Clinton vetoed H.R. 2491, the Seven-Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1995, which included the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995. THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS ON VETO OF H.R.
2491 (1995) (1995 WL 723231).
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tion,357 and most Americans could not use them without some support servic-
es, whether guides or buses or roads or food.3 58 As a matter of elementary
fairness, closing the parks, our nation's crown jewels, to all but hardy back-
packers would be politically and popularly disastrous. Neither the Hansen nor
Meyers bill considered the possibility of parks free of all facilities.
And, of course, the primitive recreation function is already served by the
National Wilderness Preservation System.359 In 1964, Congress prohibited
development in wilderness areas, and the only human activities allowed are
forms of nonmotorized recreation.' Roughly half the acreage of the park
system has been designated as wilderness, 1 so those opportunities for a
primitive wilderness experience are alive and well in the parks for those who
choose to forgo facilities and amenities.
Even if abolition or phasing out of facilities in national parks were desir-
able, it would be highly impractical. The existing investment, which, under
current law and the Fifth Amendment would have to be condemned, 2 runs
into many millions of dollars. Razing and reclamation would add billions more
to the federal bill.
2. Ban Private Entrepreneurs?
The powers-that-be have long assumed that private enterprise should pro-
vide national park services and facilities whenever and wherever it might be
profitable and appropriate to do so. Both the Meyers and Hansen bills proceed
on this assumption. Even though sentiment for turning that job over to the
NPS or any other public agency seems to be completely lacking in any politi-
cal quarter, and recent proposals have urged privatization of public resources
rather than the reverse,363 it still may be useful to examine the implicit as-
sumption that private entities are the best service and facility providers before
conforming all proposals for concessions reform to that assumption.
As matters now stand, private concessionaires receive monopolies to cater
to captive markets for any service that someone will pay for. The NPS, on the
other. hand, builds the main infrastructure such as roads and bridges and pro-
vides services such as visitor centers, lectures, trail maintenance, hiker rescues,
firefighting, security, campgrounds, clean ups, and so forth. All of these facili-
ties and amenities are free to the visiting public-and to concessionaires. The
concessionaires take large profits away from the parks while paying the United
States a relative pittance that goes into the general fund, not to the park sys-
357. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 to la-I.
358. See, e.g., J. SAx, supra note 138.
359. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994); PNRL, supra note 1, ch. 14B.
360. 16 U.S.C. § 1133 (c).
361. As of 1992, Congress had designated 39 million acres of the park system as official
wilderness. PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 2.04[21, 14B.02[2]. Congress carved additional wilderness
areas out of the California Desert Conservation Area in 1994. California Desert Protection Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471 (1994).
362. On the subject of federal liability for takings, see PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 4.04-4.06, ch.
10B.
363. E.g., S. 1031, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2032, 104th Cong. (1995) (bills that would
transfer to the states title to lands currently administered by the BLM).
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tem.' The NPS collects admission fees at many units, but those small fees
also go to the Treasury in Washington, D.C.365 These facts support the argu-
ment that the NPS should provide the profitable as well as the unprofitable
services to visitors. Public utilities traditionally were required to serve custom-
ers in relatively unprofitable outlying areas in exchange for the grant of exclu-
sive access to more profitable population centers.3" Permitting private con-
cessionaires to reap the profits of a monopoly market without bearing a fair
share of the cost of providing service to a captive market runs against this
tradition; allocating the risk of gain as well as loss to the government would
be consistent with it. Running a restaurant or gift shop is less complicated and
demanding than running a spy satellite system or building a dam. Government
personnel could pump gas, cut firewood, or run a canoe livery just as well as
corporate employees, and they would likely have more solicitude for the
parks' natural resources and values.
Certainly, elimination of private concessionaires would simplify many
conundrums and avoid many sources of inefficiency. To avoid knotty compen-
sation problems, it would be advisable, if not necessary, to impose such a
prohibition on a prospective basis only. Existing concession contracts would
be permitted to run their course but would not be renewed. If private conces-
sions were phased out in this manner, the whole bidding system and its thou-
sands of pages of regulations and its episodic bouts of litigation could be
jettisoned (although the government would still have to enter into procurement
contracts for construction materials, supplies, and the like). Most of the major
concessionaire problems identified by critics of the current system-monopoly,
possessory interests, preference renewal rights, low fees, and so forth-would
be mooted.
Due to the political environment, the counter arguments will likely pre-
vail, even though they are not nearly as strong as some of their advocates
seem to believe. The truism that this country is founded on private enterprise,
not socialistic public enterprise, has been forgotten or ignored whenever the
Congress has realized that private companies cannot or will not accomplish
what it deems to be a national priority. TVA, the irrigation of the West, Com-
sat, the Postal Service, rural electrification, Head Start, FDIC, agricultural
extension offices, and indeed, the national parks themselves, are but a few
examples. Still, the federal government has seldom ventured into profit-making
activities, and tradition militates against it. That tradition owes much to the
364. The federal government earned a 3.6% rate of return on all of its concessionaires' gross
revenues in fiscal year 1994. It earned only a 2.8% rate of return on the six land management
agencies' concessions. By way of contrast, the states of California, Maryland, Michigan, and Mis-
souri received a 12.7% rate of return on a similar range of concessions contracts during that peri-
od. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACrING, supra note 116.
365. Those fees are restricted by law. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a.
366. The practice of restricting service to the most profitable segments of a market is called
cream-skimming. See City of Morgan City v. South La. Elec. Coop. Ass'n, 31 F.3d 319, 324 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995); Associated Gas Distribs. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d
981, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1987), modified, 41 F.E.R.C. # 61,351 (1987); see also Danya B. Matthew,
Doing What Comes Naturally: Antitrust Law and Hospital Mergers, 31 HOUS. L. REv. 813, 833
(1994); Tony Prosser, Social Limits to Privatization, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 213, 237 (1995).
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initial premise that government cannot operate as efficiently as private indus-
try, another shibboleth more often recited than proven. The functioning of the
federal government when it acts in its sovereign capacity is designed to be
inefficient as a safeguard against tyranny.367 Similar safeguards are less nec-
essary when the government acts as a proprietor, and the government's exer-
cise of its sovereign functions do not disable it from acting efficiently as a
proprietor. Moreover, private sector monopolies are hardly a paradigm of
efficient behavior.3 s Monopolistic concessionaires have not offered evidence
that their performance is superior to what the government could achieve if it
appropriated the profit-making potential of park concessions to itself.
Even if concessionaires could supply such proof, it is not clear that eco-
nomically efficient provision of goods and services is the appropriate yardstick
of concessionaire performance. In national park concessions policy, service at
the least cost, generating the highest profits, should not necessarily be high on
the public priority list. Public policy should be more concerned with the quali-
ty of visitors' park experiences than with who provides them and at what
profit margin. "National Park Service, Inc." is not going to displace private
concessionaires on any large scale. Still, the idea that the agency is capable of
providing services if and when private services are absent or unsatisfactory is
not immoral or un-American, and it should not be automatically rejected. It
might even be worthwhile establishing a pilot project where the Park Service
operates expired concessions contracts at selected parks for several years.3"
At the end of that time, Congress could assess, using whatever criteria it de-
vises to gauge conformity with the objectives of park concession operations,
how the NPS concessions performed compared to previous private concessions
at the same parks and to contemporaneously operated private concessions at
other parks.
In any event, it seems clear that national parks will continue to have de-
veloped facilities for visitors and that private entities will continue to provide
the lion's share of facilities and services. But, as earlier noted, nearly all con-
cerned argue or concede that the present system is seriously flawed. How,
then, should the system be changed? That question cannot be answered until
Congress decides what the national parks should be, and for whom.
Concern with day-to-day crises often causes relative disregard for ultimate
ends. Managers (and academics) often lack the time (or inclination) to envi-
sion the best resolution of the entire problematic subject, when they are beset
367. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Frankfurt-
er, J., concurring).
368. "[F]irms in a monopoly position can restrict output, increase profits, and consequently
impose a social welfare loss by charging higher than competitive prices." SiDNEY A. SHAPERO &
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 43-44 (1993).
369. Congress has often authorized pilot projects to determine whether to embark on new
directions in natural resource law and policy. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2669 (1994) (establishing pilot
projects for production and marketing of industrial hydrocarbons and alcohols from agricultural
commodities and forest products); 16 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (implementing wood residue utiliza-
tion pilot projects); 16 U.S.C. § 5403(j)(2)(E) (1994) (describing pilot projects for innovative
approaches to management of maritime and underwater cultural resources at national parks and
similar sites).
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with putting out the daily fires. A vision of the optimum policy for conces-
sions in the national park system is, of course, a statement of political and
policy preference, but the task cannot be avoided if coherence is desired for
any particular proposal.
The object of concessions reform should not be to punish present or past
concessionaires for their real or imagined sins. They were, after all, merely
taking advantage of a favorable package of benefits that Congress had decided
was necessary and appropriate. Instead, the object should be promoting the
public interest in future concessions. Although the public interest in any par-
ticular situation can be uncertain and controversial, the public interest in this
case inheres in the nature of the national parks and the reasons they were
reserved as parks. The parks were reserved, first, for the enjoyment of the
American people. The organic Park Service statute specifically states that the
"curiosities" in the parks must be available to all and cannot be monopolized
by any one group."' Equally clearly, Congress never intended the national
parks to be amusement parks, devoted entirely to human entertainments and
comforts. Parks were created because Congress deemed each such area to be
unique and awe-inspiring in its natural attributes, and Congress specified that
those attributes (scenery, wildlife, etc.) were to be preserved for the enjoyment
and wonder of future generations.37 ' Hotels, gift shops, and canoe rentals
may be enjoyable and may even conceivably inspire wonder, but they are not
natural objects or systems worthy of preservation. Indeed, commercial enter-
prises are antithetical to basic park reservation purposes just as often as they
are necessary to full enjoyment of the parks by some.
The major objects of national park concessions policy, therefore, should
be to restrict and confine as much if not more than to enable. While the policy
should ensure equal access and full enjoyment for all Americans, it should
also strictly forbid overdevelopment of facilities. And while such a policy
must be fair to concessionaires, it should not overcompensate them either by
charging the government too little or by allowing them to charge the patrons
too much. These of course are fine lines, but line-drawing cannot be avoided
when achievement of conflicting aims is desired.
C. The Greater Questions
1. Limit or Lessen Facility Development?
The appropriate degree of development is a political question on a par
with whether any development should be allowed. Political questions should
be answered by Congress. In this case, Congress has already spoken to the
issue generally by requiring the Secretary of the Interior to encourage the pri-
vate provision and operation of "desirable" facilities and services for the ac-
commodation of park visitors,3" but its general answer controls relatively
few specific problematic instances.
370. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
371. Id. § 1.
372. Id. § 20a.
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The National Park Service's charter speaks both to recreation ("enjoy-
ment") and preservation.373 Where the two collide, present recreation should
yield to future preservation.3"4 The harm to the scenic and biotic resources
caused by intensive recreation is incompatible with future preservation, but
current preservational policies are usually compatible with future recreation
possibilities. In any event, the CPA codifies the notion of preservational prece-
dence in the realm of facility development.3 "
The competing Meyers and Hansen bills diverge very sharply in describ-
ing the desired ends of a park concessions policy. Hansen's H.R. 2028 spells
out only two purposes: (1) recognizing the importance of public-private part-
nerships; and (2) utilizing a competitive process to ensure fair prices, a fair
return, and "a reasonable opportunity for the economic viability of the con-
cessioner. ' ' 6 This assumes the appropriateness of existing and future facili-
ties. In contrast, the Meyers bill, H.R. 773, is replete with references to the
original park preservation purpose. Under this bill, Congress would find that
facilities "should be provided only under carefully controlled safeguards
against unregulated and indiscriminate use.., and... should be limited to
locations and designs consistent to the highest practicable degree with the
preservation and conservation of park resources and values.""'
Whether any particular recreational or commercial development is desir-
able or excessive is necessarily a circumstantial inquiry. If the appropriateness
of the proposal is in doubt, the better view, given the statutory strictures, is to
decide against it or to move the facility outside park boundaries. In many
cases, lands surrounding or adjacent to parks are under the control of the
BLM, the FWS, or, especially, the Forest Service. Gas stations, restaurants,
gift shops, and even campgrounds seem better suited for lands not subject to
the NPS's fundamentally preservational mandate. Coordination of concessions
policy among the federal land management agencies may be inconvenient and
require statutory amendments, but it will likely result in the achievement of a
better balance between resource protection and the provision of efficient and
adequate services to federal land users than the current patchwork arrange-
ments do.
By the same token, the.Park Service should accelerate its efforts to reduce
private motor vehicles in parks. Shuttle bus systems can transport hikers to
trailheads, campers to sites outside the back country, students to visitor cen-
ters, and all to the more popular attractions. Situations such as the overcrowd-
ing in Yosemite Valley and traffic jams around Old Faithful in Yellowstone
373. Id. §§ I to la-1.
374. See William Andrew Shutkin, Note, The National Park Service Act Revisited, 10 VA.
ENVTL. LJ. 345 (1991) (arguing that Congress intended to subordinate use to preservation in the
park system). The Eighth Circuit recently recognized that the national parks were "established for
both recreational and conservationist purposes. These purposes will sometimes, unavoidably, con-
flict, and even the Government cannot always adequately represent conflicting interests at the
same time." Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1996).
375. 16 U.S.C. § 20a.
376. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
377. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (1995) (emphasis added).
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should not be tolerated. In some cases, rationing of recreational opportunities
will be necessary. The NPS naturally is loathe to deny access to its clientele,
but some situations demand restrictions on visitor numbers.378 The Park Ser-
vice closes hiking trails when continued use creates a risk of resource degrada-
tion and also limits back country camping permits to avoid overuse. There is
no reason not to regulate access to services and amenities when a failure to do
so would create similar risks.
2. Are Special Incentives Still Necessary?
No.
379
3. Keep the Franchise Fees?
Virtually all concerned seem to agree that concessionaire franchise fees
(and entrance fees) should be kept within the park system, not remitted to
Treasury's general accounts. The GAO reported in 1996 that the rate of return
on fiscal year 1994 concessions contracts was 3.3 times higher when the con-
tracting agencies were allowed to retain over fifty percent of fees than when
they were not. "[A]gencies authorized to retain fees reported obtaining more
fees in proportion to their concessioners' gross revenues than agencies [includ-
ing the land management agencies] that were not authorized to retain
fees."3 ° The GAO concluded that agencies not able to use concessions fees
have less incentive to collect them, while those authorized to use fees to sup-
port agency operations "put forth extra effort to obtain a high rate of return on
1,381concessions.
The Meyers bill, H.R. 773, would have created a special account; half the
fee proceeds would be rebated to the park unit of origin, and half used any-
where in the park system "on the basis of need. '382 Additionally, H.R. 773
would have empowered the Secretary to establish park-by-park Park Im-
provement Funds from franchise fees.383 The Hansen bill, H.R. 2028, includ-
ed a similar provision, except that seventy-five percent of the receipts would
be reserved for use in the area of origin.384 The other differences between
the rival provisions were not substantial.
These writers suggest that, while retention of fees within the NP system is
an excellent and necessary step, it is only a first step. Even vastly increased
fees will not begin to make a substantial dent in the backlog of needed park
maintenance and rehabilitation.385 If Congress seriously intends to maintain
378. Cf. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that
since boating and rafting on the Colorado River posed a threat to the ecology of the river, the
NPS could limit usage to 96,600 user days per year).
379. See infra Part III.C.8.
380. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116.
381. Id.
382. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 9(a) (1995).
383. Id. § 9(b)
384. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 10 (1995).
385. See supra note 70 (describing the backlog of NPS maintenance needs).
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the national parks as the nation's crown jewels, further funding from some
other source or sources will be requisite. A national heritage preservation fund,
along the lines of the Land and Water Conservation Fund,386 would be ap-
propriate.
4. Who Should Own Park Improvements?
The "possessory interest" given concessionaires by current law has been a
considerable stumbling block to the introduction of competitive forces in NPS
concessions policy.3 7 Current concessionaires and their lenders and organiza-
tions remain zealous in defense of this concept, arguing that it is both neces-
sary and fair. The Hansen version recites that the policy of the United States
is "to encourage the private sector to develop, own and maintain" park facili-
ties."'8 Should the concession contract terminate, the Hansen bill would allow
the contractor to remove the improvements or be paid by the successor con-
cessionaire "fair market value" as determined by independent appraisal.3"9
The appraiser is to use an "income approach."3" As to NF and BLM lands,
the Hansen bill would have allowed the Secretaries to sell outright the lands
and facilities to concession holders, the value again to be determined by ap-
praisal.39
The Meyers bill, on the other hand, clearly states that title is to be vested
and is to remain in the United States.3" For concessionaires with existing
possessory interests on the date of enactment, their rights upon termination
remain governed by prior law.393 For new contracts involving existing pos-
sessory interests, however, the value of the improvement is to be reduced
annually by the straight-line depreciation provided by the tax code.39 The
improvement cannot be revalued upon transfer to another concessionaire,395
but the Secretary can suspend the depreciation mechanism if necessary to
obtain a satisfactory bid.396 All new structures are treated the same way: the
concessionaire's interest is limited to depreciated value as determined by the
straight-line method.397
In essence, Representative Hansen would give concessionaires permanent
property interests in whatever improvements they erect or purchase on the
federal lands-and, for NF and BLM lands, the Hansen approach would go
further and allow the concessionaires to obtain full fee title. The Meyers ap-
386. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11. See Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 25.
387. See supra notes 301-304 and accompanying text.
388. H.R. 2028 § I1(a).
389. Id. § Il(c)(1).
390. Id. § 1(c)(2).
391. Id.
392. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 15 (1995).
393. Id. § 12(a). This approach has the merit of minimizing takings questions. See supra note
362 and accompanying text.
394. H.R. 773 § 12(b)(1)(B).
395. Id. § 12(b)(1)(D).
396. Id. § 12(b)(2).
397. Id. § 12(c).
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proach would phase out private ownership of the facilities on park lands. From
the public interest standpoint, the Meyers approach is clearly preferable. Pos-
sessory interests now operate to reduce or eliminate competition among puta-
tive concessionaires, and permanent monopolies nearly always result in price-
gouging to the captive public. The GAO reported that in fiscal year 1994, new
and extended concessions agreements that granted possessory interests to pri-
vate contractors resulted in a rate of return of 3.8%, while the government
reaped a 4.5% rate of return on contracts that did not provide for such a
grant.39 Whether or not privatization is a good idea for NF and BLM lands,
it most certainly is a bad and politically unacceptable approach to the national
parks.
3 9
5. Who Should Set Service Prices (and How)?
The Hansen bill generally would let concessionaires set rates and prices
for services to the public.4' Prices pursuant to "concession service agree-
ments" (formal written contracts) would be subject to secretarial approval only
if insufficient competition existed in the vicinity."0 The approval determina-
tion would be based primarily on "comparable" services, but other factors
could be considered. The Meyers bill assumes secretarial approval of all ser-
vice charges and instructs the Secretary to consider the same factors as listed
in the Hansen bill.'
It seems abundantly clear both that the concessionaire must have some
primary controls over the prices it charges and also that some oversight mech-
anism is necessary to protect the captive public from monopolistic price-goug-
ing. "Comparable" rates are an uncertain guide because many out-of-national-
park services simply are not comparable to in-park services. A raft trip
through the Grand Canyon, for instance, is not really comparable even to a
raft trip of similar length further up the Colorado River, much less in other
venues. In contrast, prices for goods (hot dogs, film, etc.) usually can be rated
on comparability. Loose administrative oversight to curb the worst abuses
probably is the best available mechanism in the circumstances, and the compa-
rable rate at least is an objective starting point for reference.
6. External Procedures: Should the NPS Comply with the APA or
General Government Contract Law?
Section 12(d) of the Hansen bill would deny GAO jurisdiction under the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984,'0 supersede seven other resource
laws,' exempt the NPS from NEPA compliance in connection with contract
398. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116 at 34.
399. See generally Coggins & Nagel, supra note 25.
400. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
401. Id.
402. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 13 (1995).
403. Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered section of 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.).
404. H.R. 2028 § 16.
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renewals, 5 and require the agencies to promulgate a single set of imple-
menting regulations.' The Meyers bill would exempt the NPS from the
general federal leasing statute,' and require regulation promulgation in sev-
eral situations," but it otherwise does not address those procedural compli-
ance issues.
Whatever legislative reasons underlie the APA public property exemption
from rulemaking requirements,' they are not sufficient to overcome the
presumption that legal rules governing national parks should be accessible
without undue effort by any interested party. Neither prospective contractors
nor the general public should have to resort to obscure and unpublished agen-
cy manuals to determine the rules of the concessions contract game. The Park
Service, by expanding its use of rulemaking procedures in recent years, 1 °
implicitly recognizes the validity of that proposition. There is no good reason
why the NPS should not be required to make its rules public and available.
The advisability of subjecting concessions contracts to general government
contracting law is a more abstract and more difficult question.41 ' Given the
specifics in either the Meyers or Hansen bills, however, and the safeguards
each contains (Meyers more than Hansen), it seems unduly duplicative and
inefficient to import other sets of criteria probably intended for use in ordinary
government procurement, not provision of visitor services.
7. Statutory Rules or Administrative Discretion?
Neither the Hansen nor the Meyers bill directly confronts the questions
whether and to what extent Congress should delegate administrative "flexibili-
ty" to the National Park Service. Implicitly, the Hansen bill, by calling for
"partnerships" and not limiting facility development; opts for much adminis-
trative discretion except in the realm of impinging on concessionaire rights
and interests. 412 This version avoids "micromanagement" while allowing con-
tractors property rights that could preclude effective, discretionary regulation.
The Meyers bill is stricter on both the agency and its concessionaires. It too
necessarily delegates considerable administrative authority, but it has both
clearer directives on how such authority is to be exercised and also limits
assertions of private property rights in various ways.
We submit that the Meyers approach is preferable, although it probably
does not go far enough in channeling administrative discretion. The history of
federal public land law in general is replete with instances where agencies
have abused administrative discretion to accommodate commodity land us-
405. Id. § 7(e).
406. Id. § 18(a).
407. H.R. 773 § 16.
408. Id. §§ 6(a), 7(b), 8(b).
409. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1994). See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Arthur Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Prop-
erty. Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
410. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 177-184 and accompanying text.
412. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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ers.413 The extremely low return to the government from national park con-
cessions can be added to that list. Some degree of flexibility and discretion is
inevitable, otherwise the land managers would be mere ciphers. Nevertheless,
Congress traditionally has erred on the side of too much flexibility and too
few concrete legal guidelines.
8. "Partnerships" or Arms-Length Relations?
In any assessment of the Hansen and Meyers concessions reform legisla-
tion, a very basic question is whether the relationships between the United
States and its contractors are to be paternalistic or businesslike. Paternalism
(through subsidies, preferences, forgiveness, gifts, etc.) traditionally has been
rife throughout federal land law,4 4 and contemporary instances still abound.
In most cases, special treatment of this ilk has done more harm than good,
leaving such legacies as sterile, eroding grazing land, wasteful, inappropriate
agricultural practices, mine-scarred landscapes, poisoned watercourses, and
ugly clearcuts. We submit that the far superior policy is for the United States
to act in a businesslike arms-length fashion when dealing with for-profit insti-
tutions, whatever their size.
D. The Lesser Questions
1. Preference in Renewal or New Services?
The Meyers version recites that "a competitive selection process" is good
public policy and goes on to reject flatly preference in renewals4 " or in con-
tracting for additional services,"6 subject to two exceptions. Providers of
"outfitting guide, river running, or other substantially similar services within a
park" are entitled to preference renewal if their performances were satisfac-
tory.""4 7 Small concessionaires (gross receipts under $500,000) similarly
have a right to meet competing bids.4 ' The Hansen bill stresses "economic
viability" as well as the need for a "competitive process."4 9 That process is
watered down, however, by the provisions which would award existing con-
cessionaires "renewal incentives." If the prior concessionaire exceeded the
contract requirements, it would be entitled to a renewal incentive of twenty
percent "of the maximum points available" under performance evaluations; 20
a concessionaire who merely "meets" those agreement requirements would get
five percent.42 The Hansen bill would also empower the Secretary to "modi-
fy" existing agreements to allow the concessionaire to provide "closely relat-
413. See, e.g., PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 19.01[2], 21B.04[1J.
414. See generally id.
415. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. §§ 2(b)(5), 7(g) (1995).
416. Id. § 70).
417. Id. § 7(h).
418. Id. § 7(i).
419. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 2(2) (1995).
420. Id. § 7(d)(2)(A).
421. Id. § 7(d)(2)(B).
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ed" services, evidently without any competitive process.422
Hansen's bill implicitly recognizes the anticompetitive effects of prefer-
ences by reducing their scope considerably. Still, the Meyers approach is pref-
erable (although it arguably does not go far enough) because it is a clear state-
ment that largely avoids the squabbles that will be inevitable in the Hansen
partial credit scheme. The existence of the preference renewal right was a
primary reform impetus; rooting it out as completely as possible should be the
first task of such reform. The GAO reported that in 1994, new NPS contracts
that included preferential rights of renewal generated a 3.8% rate of return.
Contracts without a preference resulted in a 6.4% rate of return." These fig-
ures confirm the obvious: "concessions agreements entered into on a competi-
tive basis had higher rates of return than those that were not competed.1
4 4
Preferential renewal rights deprive prospective concessionaires of much of
their incentive to spend time and money preparing bids because of the likeli-




Representative Meyers's preference for guide services makes little differ-
ence in practice because such services seldom constitute monopolies and usu-
ally do not require elaborate in-park facilities. Preference renewal for relative-
ly small concessionaires, however, effectively insulates what may be the least
efficient providers from competition by other small businesses.
2. Distinguish Between Large and Small Contracts?
Representative Hansen's H.R. 2028 differentiates between "concession
service agreements" and "concession licenses." '426 The former is the usual
concession contract while the latter may be given for "infrequent" activities
where either any number can supply the goods or services involved or the
situation lacks "competitive interest." 27 Concession licenses may not exceed
three years4' and are nontransferable,4' but no fee setting mechanism is
indicated. The Meyers bill, on the other hand, makes size distinctions in sever-
al contexts. As mentioned above, concessionaires who either have annual gross
receipts of less than $500,000 or provide guide services (evidently assumed to
be small entities) remain entitled to preference renewal rights.43" H.R. 773
would also provide different rules for "concession contracts" and "commercial
use authorizations.""43 The latter would be relatively rare because the secre-
tarial authority to issue them would be tightly restricted. They would be avail-
able only if:
422. Id. § 7(f).
423. GAO, CONCESSIONS CONTRACTING, supra note 116, at 35.
424. Id. at 6.
425. Id. at 7.
426. H.R. 2028 § 4.
427. Id. § 4(a)(2).
428. Id. § 4(b)(1).
429. Id. § 6(b).
430. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. §§ 7(h), 7(i) (1995).
431. Id. §§ 3(2), 6.
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The applicant has gross revenues of not more than $25,000 (or oper-
ates outside a park, using the park only incidentally);
432
The use will have "minimal impact" on park resources and is consis-
tent with park preservation; 433 and
In the aggregate, the uses do not harm park values.434
Only a "reasonable" fee need be paid for commercial use authorizations,
which are limited to two-year terms.433
The United States and individual states long have had laws and policies
that discriminate in favor of smaller business entities, the Small Business
Administration subsidies being only one of many examples. That policy pref-
erence is rife in many areas of public natural resources law, from reclamation
limitations4 36 to mining claim assessment work fees. 47 Still, it is not be-
yond reasonable contention that such discrimination is inappropriate when
dealing with for-profit businesses. As argued above, it is a bad idea to make
renewal preferences available and such preferences should be jettisoned en-
tirely from NPS concessions law. The case is even stronger for abolishing
preferences for relatively small concessionaires because the competitors being
precluded usually are also small businesses.
The distinction between contracts and licenses, however, is sensible in
several contexts. The difference between, say, a hotel complex concession and
permission to conduct horse rides along park trails is enormous in most ways
of measuring. Representative Meyers' limitations on licenses, stressing mini-
mal impact on park resources, would be consistent with basic park poli-
cies-although the $25,000 gross revenue limitation seems overly restrictive.
3. Should Departures from Competitive Bidding be Allowed, and If So,
When?
Both the Hansen and Meyers bills are full of exceptions to competitive
bidding, and, indeed, the main contract award mechanisms of each contain
subjective standards that detract from pure competition. Preferences, posses-
sory interests, and noncompetitive licenses (not to mention the natural advan-
tages of an entrenched operation) also lower the quantum of competition. In
line with the recommendation above that the United States eschew paternalism
in favor of treating businesses as businesses, we submit that any concessions
reform legislation expressly adopt competitive bidding as the norm and tightly
restrict any administrative discretion to depart from that norm. An obvious
situation where a departure probably will be justified is when no bids are
received in response to a proposal.43 But such exceptions should be rare.
432. Id. § 6(c)(1).
433. Id. §§ 6(b)(1) to 6(b)(2)(B).
434. Id. § 6(b)(2)(D).
435. Id. §§ 6(b)(2)(A), 6(d).
436. See PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 21B.03[4], 21B.04[3].
437. See id. § 25.0316].
438. Cf PNRL, supra note 1, § 20.03[31 (discussing the Forest Service's authority to reject
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4. Depreciation or Appraisal as a Valuation Method?
The Hansen bill in essence continues the present system whereby a con-
cessionaire whose contract is terminated is entitled to compensation for the
"fair market value" of any improvements to be used by the successor, and it
establishes income-approach appraisal as the method for determining that val-
ue.439 The Meyers bill, on the other hand,. would phase in straight-line depre-
ciation as the valuation method for concessionaire built improvements.' The
difference is fundamental. The Hansen approach gives contractors a perpetual
near-fee interest in facilities on park lands, while the Meyers approach would
result in eventual public ownership of those facilities. For all of the reasons
elicited in sections IIB.2.c and IIIC.4 above, straight-line depreciation is a far
better measuring standard. Indeed, we urge Congress to consider whether to go
an additional step and deduct from initial cost of improvement the depreciation
actually claimed by the concessionaire on its income tax returns.
5. Franchise Fees: Gross or Net?
Both the Meyers and Hansen bills finesse the problem of franchise fee
calculation. The Meyers version recites that:
Franchise fees, however stated, shall not be less than the minimum
fee established by the Secretary for each contract. The minimum fee
shall be determined in a manner that will provide the concessioner
with a reasonable opportunity to realize a profit on the operation as a
whole, commensurate with the capital invested and the obligations
assumed under the contract."
This standard, of course, says virtually nothing. The Hansen bill is only a little
more forthcoming. The Secretary is to set a minimum fee based on "histori-
cal" data, but the final fee will be the amount actually bid.' 2 The fee there-
after can be modified only for inflation unless the concessionaire agrees." 3
Publicity about seemingly absurdly low franchise fees fueled the concern
that led to these reform proposals, yet neither directly confronts the prob-
lem. 4 In other contexts, Congress has set minimum royalties for mineral
extraction"' and park entrance fees are also dictated by legislation.' A
private lessor seldom guarantees its lessee commensurate profits. The Meyers
version, with its generous grant of discretion to the NPS to set minimum fees,
is better than the Hansen version, but a statutory provision setting a minimum
at some percentage of gross revenues appears even more preferable.
all bids on timber sale contracts).
439. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 11(c)(1995).
440. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 12 (1995).
441. Id. § 8(a).
442. H.R. 2028 § 9(b).
443. Id. § 9(c).
444. See supra notes 221-223 and accompanying text.
445. See PNRL, supra note 1, §§ 22.03[3][d], 23.03[2][b][iv], 24.0413][b1.
446. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a.
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6. How to Resolve Disputes?
The Hansen bill provides for establishment of a Board of Concession
Appeals which, although similar to the Interior Board of Land Appeals, would
be "an independent administrative review board."" 7 It would have jurisdic-
tion over all concessions matters except "expiration of a concession authoriza-
tion." Thereafter any person may seek judicial review in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act. 9 "Concession license" decisions
would be reviewed in federal district court. ° Then, in a curious provision,
the Hansen bill says that "[i]f the Secretary concerned breaches a concession
authorization, the Secretary shall pay just compensation to the concession-
er.' '451 The Meyers bill contains no equivalent provision, leaving matters to
review under the Administrative Procedure Act or to contract damage actions
under the Tucker Act. It does instruct the Secretary to promulgate dispute
resolution regulations in the sole context of contract awards.45
We agree with Representative Hansen that a reform bill ought to spell out
a dispute resolution mechanism, but we disagree with the version he has pro-
posed. First, the "just compensation" provision is unprecedented, unwarranted,
and little short of silly. Just compensation is the appropriate remedy for a Fifth
Amendment taking;453 damages are appropriate for a breach of contract. The
agency is already liable for contract breaches under the current law.41 4 Sec-
ond, creation of an independent board makes scnse only if the legislation cov-
ers all concession-granting agencies--a question beyond the scope of this
article. Third, the exception from review of concession authorization expiration
is at best mysterious: if preference rights are to be retained at all, then those
with some form of preference certainly have a legitimate interest in seeking
review if they are terminated.
A faster and cheaper alternative mechanism would be assignment of a
single administrative law judge to the National Park Service to make the initial
ruling on NPS/concessionaire disputes, with one appeal to the Secretary. The
statute should specify periods of time in which both the ALJ and the Secretary
must rule. Thereafter, review would be in the appropriate federal court, de-
pending on whether the relief sought is equitable (federal district court) or
damages (Court of Federal Claims).
447. H.R. 2028 § 12(a)(1).
448. Id. § 12(a)(2).
449. Id. § 12(c)(2).
450. Id. § 12(c)(3).
451. Id. § 13.
452. H.R. 773, 104th Cong. § 7(a)(2) (1995).
453. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
454. See PNRL supra note 1, ch. 9.
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
7. How to Evaluate Concessionaire Performance?
The Meyers and Hansen bills do not differ very drastically in the matter
of evaluating concessionaire performance. The Meyers bill requires only "peri-
odic" (as opposed to annual) evaluations, does not define performance criteria,
and generally gives the Secretary more authority to discipline or terminate
unsatisfactory concessionaires." The Hansen version contains sketchy crite-
ria and in general is more solicitous of concessionaire interests. 56 Neither
provision adds much to either bill, and neither seems to change current law
very much.
The Court of Federal Claims in the 1993 YRT case457 formulated a rath-
er restrictive test for the judicial review of NPS selection of concessionaires,
which, according to the court, "essentially involve[s] a matter of business
judgment. ''M This deferential review posture is appropriate, but for reasons
somewhat different from those stated by the court. As indicated above,459 the
Park Service ought to engage in arms-length transactions with its concession-
aires, rather than bestowing upon them unwarranted and preferential treatment
not available to businesses normally operating in a competitive market. But
Park Service concessions are not just businesses designed to maximize profit
for their operators. Instead, they have been authorized by Congress to enhance
the recreational experiences enjoyed by Park Service visitors, and that ought to
be an important touchstone of concessionaire performance. It is therefore ap-
propriate, as Meyers's bill does, to vest in the NPS considerable discretion to
select, evaluate, and terminate concessionaires in conformity with that goal.
The agency's efforts to implement its responsibilities typically will require a
balancing of potentially conflicting aspects of recreation, such as the provision
of more campgrounds and the preservation of unspoiled natural areas. In exer-
cising that discretion, the Park Service should of course assess the
concessionaire's managerial competence and financial solvency;' poorly
supplied concessions facilities that are in physical disrepair are not likely to
meet the demands of park visitors, and they may detract from visual enjoy-
ment of the parks. These are likely to be the easy cases, however. How should
the NPS regard an efficient concessionaire whose operations appear to reflect
less than an optimal sensibility for the scenic wonders amidst which the con-
cession is located? The criterion referred to in the YRT case--the extent to
which the concessionaire understands the NPS mission and the concessioner's
role in carrying out that mission--is obviously quite amorphous, but at
bottom the priorities it reflects are sound. Concessionaire evaluations should
be based on factors that include quality of visitor services, financial perfor-
455. H.R. 773 § 14.
456. H.R. 2028, 104th Cong. § 8 (1995).
457. YRT Servs. Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed. C1. 366 (1993); see supra Part n.B.2.b.i.
458. YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. C1. at 394.
459. See supra Part II.B.8.
460. See YRT Servs. Corp., 28 Fed. C. at 371-72.
461. id. at 376.
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mance, and compliance with the provisions of the contract and applicable
laws. 2
CONCLUSION
Millions of visitors each year stream through the national parks. Many if
not most of them seek out goods or services to embellish some aspect of their
visits. The management of national parks concessions is therefore big busi-
ness. The consensus of opinion from all corners seems to be that this business
has not been functioning smoothly. The excessive development of concessions
facilities, the shielding of concessionaires from normal competitive processes,
the provision of an inadequate share of concessions revenues to the govern-
ment, and the inability of the Park Service to devote the government's revenue
share to needed facility maintenance and other park improvement projects all
have been raised as negative features of the status quo.
Although a consensus in favor of reform has emerged, the shape of that
reform has been harder to agree upon. The two major reform vehicles debated
in Congress during the 104th Congress represent incremental reform, although
one of the reform bills, H.R. 1028, seems more heavily weighted in favor of
concessionaire interests than the other, H.R. 773. We have suggested in this
article that a broader inquiry is called for, one which takes nothing for granted
and which questions even heretofore unassailable premises such as the as-
sumptions that the parks ought to be developed and that concessions facilities
are best run by private entrepreneurs. We also recognize, however, that, even
revolutions in administrative structuring hailed as fait accomplis often wind up
as revolutions that never were. Radical reforms engendered by reassessments
of initial premises are therefore unlikely.
The less fundamental but still important questions implicated in national
park concessions reform include determination of the optimal level of recre-
ation facility development and recreational services, of the uses to which con-
cession fees should be allocated, of the locus of responsibility for and the
mechanisms that govern the establishment of fees for goods and services, and
of the degree to which concessionaires should be treated in a manner apart
from other government contractors. It will be impossible for policymakers to
resolve these questions without an overriding conception of the role that the
parks should play, which in turn may entail establishing a hierarchy among the
functions served by the national parks. In our view, the most fundamental
tension is between developing the parks in a manner that increases access to
park resources and developing them in a manner that removes from the parks
the natural attributes responsible for their designation as national parks in the
first place. There is certainly ample room in many instances to achieve the
first goal without sacrificing the second. If, however, conflict becomes un-
462. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-280, pt. 1 (1995), available in 1995 WL 646552 (§
9306(a)(1) of the Visitor Facilities and Services Enhancement Act of 1995).
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avoidable, then we submit that the preservation purposes of the parks should
take precedence over their recreational aspects, as Congress appears to have
intended both when it enacted the Park Service's organic act and when it
adopted the CPA. Having faced the essential policy conundrums involved in
resolving this tension, policymakers should find it relatively easy to answer the
more prosaic questions raised in section IlD above, or at least to conclude
that these questions can be addressed by analogy to government contract
mechanisms in other areas.
